Here. The motivation for the paper is my attraction to value-driven epistemology, which I’ve endorsed in the abstract, but never tried to use to actually do some epistemology. Here I try, at least. And the draft is, let us say, … Continue reading
A reminder of the conference that Edinburgh’s Epistemology Research Cluster is hosting in May 2012. The Aims of Inquiry and Cognition is sponsored by the Scots Philosophical Association and the Mind Association. Invited speakers include Ted Sider, Carolyn Price, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Stephen Grimm, and Kristoffer Ahlstrom. There’s also a call for … Continue reading
This past semester, I tried an experiment: I Beamer-ed up my entire epistemology course, so I thought I’d make the slides public. (For LaTeX-uninitiated, Beamer is a LaTeX class for creating slide presentations.) Some of the material on the slides … Continue reading
Just an observation: deontic talk, in much of ordinary discourse, is exaggerated. This point is important for epistemology as well as for theories of the rationality of action. Paradigm example: my wife gets a “free gift” card from retailer X. … Continue reading
Here’s a draft of a forthcoming paper on epistemic value. It overviews the literature and briefly explores a few new ideas. There’s still time for revisions, and I’d be happy to hear what anyone thinks: http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/whitcod/EV1-22-10.pdf
There is a ton of recent work on the Meno problem (or problems) about the value of knowledge. That work is interesting and creative, but often annoyingly unclear about just what the Meno problem (or problems) is (or are) supposed … Continue reading
Going to the conference in Geneva next week, and will talk about curiosity. In preparation, a minor sidepoint about it. The issue is what kind of motivational state curiosity is. So, first, a partial list of motivational states. They include … Continue reading
Here’s a way of thinking about the value of things. The relationship between what is valuable and our valuing can take two explanatory directions. Sometimes we value things because of the value that they have in themselves or in relation … Continue reading
This is a reminder that the deadline for submitting an abstract for the Epistemic Goodness conference is November 1st. Abstracts should be submitted directly to me at duncan.pritchard@ed.ac.uk. For more details about the conference, click here. … Continue reading
Suppose you are tempted to agree with Lewis et. al. that knowledge doesn’t imply belief. Lewis’s example is of a timid student, uncertain of a given claim who will only hesitatingly answer, but answers correctly nonetheless. Not the most persuasive … Continue reading