The 2014 Central States Philosophical Association meeting, hosted by Northwestern University, will take place on the campus of Northwestern University (Evanston, IL) on October 10-11, 2014.
Keynote Speaker: Professor L. A. Paul (University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
You need not be a member of an institution in the central states area to participate. Colloquium papers in any area of philosophy are welcome. Papers are limited to 3,000 words. Submissions should be prepared for a blind review and should include a separate title page with author information, a word count for the paper, and an abstract (not longer than 150 words). The title page and the paper should be submitted as separate documents. No author-identifying references should appear in the paper. Both the title page and the paper should be submitted as MS Word, RTF, or PDF files.
The deadline for submissions is June 15, 2014.
Submissions should be sent by e-mail, using the subject heading “CSPA submission,” to email@example.com. Responses to submissions will be sent by August 15, 2014.
Suggestions for commentators and session chairs (including self-nominations) are welcome. Suggestions and questions regarding the program should be directed to Anita Superson at: firstname.lastname@example.org.
Questions concerning local arrangements should be directed to Sandy Goldberg at email@example.com.
(24-25 October 2014; Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA)
- Submission deadline: *** Friday, May 30, 2014 ***
- Notification by: June 30, 2014
- Submission requirement: Extended abstract (1,000 words or less)
- Submit extended abstracts via email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
- Accommodations: Expenses for travel, hotel, and meals will be covered in full for any graduate students presenting at the conference. Hotel and meals will be provided for all other presenters.
- Publication: Selected papers from ILCS1 and this workshop may be published in an edited volume or journal special issue. When submitting, please note whether you would like your paper to be considered for inclusion in a proceedings volume.
- Website: http://jonahschupbach.com/ILCS/
- Tania Lombrozo (University of California, Berkeley)
- Elliott Sober (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
- Katie Steele (London School of Economics)
This is the 2nd workshop on Inductive Logic and Confirmation in Science. ILCS1, organized by Juergen Landes and Jon Williamson, was held in Paris in October 2013. This series of workshops is addressed to all researchers (early and not so early career) in all disciplines who have an interest in inductive logic and confirmation theory as they relate to science and the philosophy of science. PhD students are particularly encouraged to participate. The workshop is free and open to anyone. If you plan to attend (and are not on the list of presenters), please register by simply dropping an email to the organizers with your name and affiliation.
“Practical Reasons: Their Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Creation”
Cologne, September 15–19, 2014.
Our special guest this year will be David Enoch (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel). Enoch defends a strong version of normative and moral realism – the view that normative and moral truths are universal, objective, and are discovered rather than constructed. In his lectures, Enoch will first expand on the nature of the debate and underlying motivations for realism. He will then address two main challenges to such a view – namely, the claim that even if there are such reasons or normative truths we have no way of coming to know about them; and worries having to do with normative disagreement. Enoch will conclude with highlighting a way in which even on a realist account, reasons can still be created by us, drawing some more practical lessons. The Summer School mainly aims at professional philosophers and advanced graduate students.
Attendance is free, but limited to 50 participants – to be selected on the basis of motivation and qualification. Online application is possible through May 15. Add a short letter sketching your academic background and your main motivation for participating in the Summer School. If you are interested in giving a brief presentation (approx. 20 minutes) on Enoch’s work, please send along an abstract of up to 1,000 words. We will inform you about the success of your application soon after the deadline has expired.
Apply via email to:
For more information, please visit our website.
When I consider the NEDP for reliabilism, the intuitions involved seem to support the view that external properties (e.g. reliable belief production) are not directly relevant to justification. Furthermore, I take the motivating principle that is behind the intuition in NEDP cases to be the following:
MP1: Only conscious, internal properties are directly relevant to justification.
(I mean ‘directly relevant’ in such a way that all MP1 is really expressing is that justificational properties supervene on conscious internal properties.)
I think this is a better lesson to draw than the more common
MP2: Only mental properties are directly relevant to justification.
This is because epistemologists like Jack Lyons have given good reasons to think that NEDP cases are good evidence that mental properties that are completely unaccessible to the believer are not directly relevant to justification. But what about the following?
MP3: Only internal properties that are conscious or that the believer can make conscious are directly relevant to justification.
This is a nice middle position between MP1 and MP2. However, there are NEDP cases that show that unconscious, accessible mental states are justificationally irrelevant. Continue reading
Research award winners for the summer seminar for 2014 for The Faith Project are:
Andy Cullison, Associate Professor, SUNY-Fredonia
Frances Howard-Snyder, Professor, Western Washington University
Jonathan Jacobs, Assistant Professor, St. Louis University
Mark Lance, Professor, Georgetown University
Ryan Preston-Roedder, Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina
Dan McKaughan, Associate Professor, Boston College
Paddy McShane, Instructor, Norlin Scholars Program, University of Colorado
Rik Peels, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Utrecht University (the Netherlands)
Lindsay Rettler, Graduate Student, Ohio State University
Blake Roeber, Assistant Professor, University of Notre Dame
Meghan Sullivan, Assistant Professor, University of Notre Dame
Peter van Elswyk, Graduate Student, Rutgers University
Congratulations to each, and we look forward to a fantastic seminar this coming summer!
From 25 to 29 August 2014, the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Groningen will host two co-located summer schools with a common theme: Epistemology and Cognition. One of the summer schools will focus on contemporary philosophy and is co-organized with the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bristol. The other summer school will have a historical focus and is co-organized with the Department of Philosophy of the Radboud University Nijmegen.
Further information is available here.
I’ve argued in a recent paper (see here or here) that remembering that p entails knowing that p. If this is so, then remembering that p should not be present in Gettier cases, which is what we find. Here is an example I use:
“I take my students by a field where I know that there are no sheep, but there is a sheep-shaped rock that, from the road, looks exactly like a real sheep. I also know that there is a lone sheep on the far side of the field, well out of sight. I see that one of my students has caught her eye on the sheep-shaped rock, and I hear her say to herself, ‘What a happy looking sheep in that field!’ I snicker and say quietly to myself, ‘She doesn’t know that there’s a sheep in that field.’ Later, when we arrive at our destination, I ask, ‘Does anybody remember whether there were any sheep in the field we drove by?’ The same student says, ‘Yeah, I remember that there was a sheep in the field.’ I judge her and say quietly to myself, ‘She doesn’t remember that there was a sheep in the field.’ In this scenario, my final statement seems true, despite the fact that she has a justified, true belief that there was a sheep in the field. It is by sheer accident that she has a true belief.” Continue reading
EUROPEAN EPISTEMOLOGY NETWORK MEETING 2014, MADRID, JUNE 30 – JULY 2
The European Epistemology Network provides a platform for cooperation and exchange among epistemologists and those interested in the theory of knowledge in Europe.
The 2014 meeting will be organized by the Autonomous University of Madrid. It will be held at Madrid from Monday 30th of June to Wednesday 2nd of July.
Submissions in any area of epistemology (broadly construed) are welcome.
1. Please prepare a max. 500 word abstract for blind review.
2. Send it to email@example.com on or before *20th of March 2014*.
3. Expect a letter of acceptance by *10th of April 2014*.
Contributors whose abstracts are accepted will have a slot of 40 minutes (25 min presentation + 15 min Q&A)
Annalisa Coliva (University of Modena)
Pascal Engel (EHESS, Paris)
Jordi Fernández (University of Adelaide)
Mikkel Gerken (University of Edinburgh)
Klemens Kappel (University of Copenhagen)
Erik J. Olsson (Lund University)
Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen (Yonsei University)
Sarah Sawyer (University of Sussex)
René van Woudenberg (VU University Amsterdam)