Research award winners for the summer seminar for 2014 for The Faith Project are:
Andy Cullison, Associate Professor, SUNY-Fredonia
Frances Howard-Snyder, Professor, Western Washington University
Jonathan Jacobs, Assistant Professor, St. Louis University
Mark Lance, Professor, Georgetown University
Ryan Preston-Roedder, Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina
Dan McKaughan, Associate Professor, Boston College
Paddy McShane, Instructor, Norlin Scholars Program, University of Colorado
Rik Peels, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Utrecht University (the Netherlands)
Lindsay Rettler, Graduate Student, Ohio State University
Blake Roeber, Assistant Professor, University of Notre Dame
Meghan Sullivan, Assistant Professor, University of Notre Dame
Peter van Elswyk, Graduate Student, Rutgers University
Congratulations to each, and we look forward to a fantastic seminar this coming summer!
From 25 to 29 August 2014, the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Groningen will host two co-located summer schools with a common theme: Epistemology and Cognition. One of the summer schools will focus on contemporary philosophy and is co-organized with the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bristol. The other summer school will have a historical focus and is co-organized with the Department of Philosophy of the Radboud University Nijmegen.
Further information is available here.
I’ve argued in a recent paper (see here or here) that remembering that p entails knowing that p. If this is so, then remembering that p should not be present in Gettier cases, which is what we find. Here is an example I use:
“I take my students by a field where I know that there are no sheep, but there is a sheep-shaped rock that, from the road, looks exactly like a real sheep. I also know that there is a lone sheep on the far side of the field, well out of sight. I see that one of my students has caught her eye on the sheep-shaped rock, and I hear her say to herself, ‘What a happy looking sheep in that field!’ I snicker and say quietly to myself, ‘She doesn’t know that there’s a sheep in that field.’ Later, when we arrive at our destination, I ask, ‘Does anybody remember whether there were any sheep in the field we drove by?’ The same student says, ‘Yeah, I remember that there was a sheep in the field.’ I judge her and say quietly to myself, ‘She doesn’t remember that there was a sheep in the field.’ In this scenario, my final statement seems true, despite the fact that she has a justified, true belief that there was a sheep in the field. It is by sheer accident that she has a true belief.” Continue reading
EUROPEAN EPISTEMOLOGY NETWORK MEETING 2014, MADRID, JUNE 30 – JULY 2
The European Epistemology Network provides a platform for cooperation and exchange among epistemologists and those interested in the theory of knowledge in Europe.
The 2014 meeting will be organized by the Autonomous University of Madrid. It will be held at Madrid from Monday 30th of June to Wednesday 2nd of July.
Submissions in any area of epistemology (broadly construed) are welcome.
1. Please prepare a max. 500 word abstract for blind review.
2. Send it to firstname.lastname@example.org on or before *20th of March 2014*.
3. Expect a letter of acceptance by *10th of April 2014*.
Contributors whose abstracts are accepted will have a slot of 40 minutes (25 min presentation + 15 min Q&A)
Annalisa Coliva (University of Modena)
Pascal Engel (EHESS, Paris)
Jordi Fernández (University of Adelaide)
Mikkel Gerken (University of Edinburgh)
Klemens Kappel (University of Copenhagen)
Erik J. Olsson (Lund University)
Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen (Yonsei University)
Sarah Sawyer (University of Sussex)
René van Woudenberg (VU University Amsterdam)
Suppose you engage in a long chain of reasoning: you believe that 1) p, 2) if p then q, 3) therefore q, 4) if q then r, 5) therefore, r, 6) if r, then s, etc. You justifiably believe each of these premises, and on their basis, come to justifiably believe their conclusion: z.
The next day, at 7am, while you are eating breakfast, you gain a reason to give up belief in p. So, you give up belief in p.
At 9am, while you are eating second breakfast, it dawns on you that by giving up belief that q, you have lost a crucial reason for believing z. So, you withhold belief in z. We can stipulate that any ordinary human would not have noticed the connection between p and z very easily; it is natural that you would only see the connection a couple of hours later.
It is clear to me that you are not justified in believing z at 10am. It is not so clear to me what the justificatory status of your belief in z is between 8am and 10am. I’m inclined both ways, which inclines me to think that disambiguation is needed. Perhaps I am justified (in the blamelessness sense of ‘justified’) in believing z, but I am not justified (in the evidential sense of ‘justified’) in believing z. However, I’m hesitant to claim that a disambiguation is needed.
(This post is inspired by a case given by Kevin McCain in his forthcoming book.)
I have argued that the NEDP is a problem for nearly all versions of internalism. Consider Augustine*, who in his seventy-six years of life, experiences all of Augustine’s conscious states but has no unconscious internal states. With respect to their conscious life, there is no discernable difference. I appealed to the intuition that the justificational status of Augustine and Augustine*’s conscious beliefs is the same. It seems plausible to conclude that Augustine*’s unconscious, internal states are justificationally irrelevant to his conscious beliefs. This is one version of my global NEDP for internalism. (For earlier Certain Doubts discussion, see here.)
In his forthcoming book defending evidentialism, and in a forthcoming article in Acta Analytica (available on his website under “Research” and “Publications”, see here), Kevin McCain argues that my NEDP fails to show there is a problem for internalism. The force of his argument is in this quote: Continue reading
Ernest Sosa had two big ideas about knowledge:
- In papers like “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore” (Philosophical Perspectives 1999), he argued that knowledge requires safety: for my belief in p to count as knowledge, it must be something that could not easily happen that I would have a belief on the kind of basis on which I in fact believe p in a proposition that is false.
- In his 2007 book A Virtue Epistemology (Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. I), he argued that basic knowledge consists in a belief that is apt – a belief that is not merely competent and also correct, but a belief that is correct precisely because
it is competent.
When he adopted the second idea, he simultaneously abandoned the first idea, arguing that there are cases in which a belief is apt but not safe, and in such cases the belief in question could still be knowledge (A Virtue Epistemology, pp. 29, 41).
It is only this last move that seems mistaken to me. Both of Sosa’s big ideas are fundamentally true. The two ideas are not in tension with each other, since – as I shall argue – no apt belief can be unsafe. Continue reading
There’s a call for papers for the 2nd Midsummer Philosophy Conference. This event alternates between the Eidyn research centre in Edinburgh and Cambridge, and this year it’s in Cambridge. Last year’s event was a great success, and I’m sure this year’s one will be too, so I encourage you all to submit something, particularly if you are an early career researcher.
Now in its second year, the series honors one of the great figures of 20th century epistemology. The conference this year is February 22 and further information can be found here.