The 13th Cologne Summer School in Philosophy (CSSiP) on
NEW TRENDS IN APPLIED EPISTEMOLOGY
takes place in Cologne from August 6 to August 10, 2018. Our special guest is Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University). Over the last two decades Jennifer Lackey has deepened and significantly enhanced our understanding of social epistemology. In her recent work, including her forthcoming new book, she explores in detail the real-world phenomena related to knowledge in a social context. The Summer School will specifically focus on the following themes:
• Collective Epistemology and Group Belief
• Social Knowing
• Lies and Bullshit
• False Confessions and Credibility
• Epistemology of Punishment
The Summer School mainly aims at professional philosophers and graduate students, but anyone is welcome to apply.
Attendance is free but limited to 50 participants – to be selected on the basis of motivation and qualification. Online application is possible through May 1. Please supply a short letter that sketches your academic background and main motivation for participating in the Summer School. If you are interested in giving a brief presentation (approx. 20 minutes) related to Lackey’s work, please also send an abstract of no more than 1,000 words. We will inform you about the result of your application soon after the deadline.
Apply via email to:
For more information, please visit our website:
Prof. Dr. Thomas Grundmann
Universität zu Köln
We welcome submissions of abstracts for pre-read and short presentations at the 4th Foundations of Normativity Workshop, taking place at the University of Edinburgh on June 14 & 15, 2018. This year’s workshop will focus on issues in contemporary moral epistemology. Our invited speakers are Prof. Justin Clarke-Doane (Columbia), Prof. Sarah McGrath (Princeton) and Dr. Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge).
Four submissions will be selected for pre-read and presentation. To be considered, please submit an abstract of 750 to 1000 words (not including references) to firstname.lastname@example.org with the subject ‘FoN4 submission’ by March 15, 2018. Make sure to send the abstract as a PDF, suitable for blind review, using [papertitle]+abstract as the filename of the abstract. We would like to particularly encourage submissions by members of underrepresented groups. Feel free to indicate that if you are a member of such a group.
The programme committee aims to make selections by April 15, 2018. Invited papers should be ready for circulation by May 25, 2018. There will be limited travel bursaries available for some of the selected participants, with preference given to those without access to research funds from their home institutions.
The workshop is generously supported by the Edinburgh Philosophy Department and the Eidyn research centre. For more information about the event, please visit: https://foundationsofnormativity.wordpress.com.
After a three year hiatus from Choice & Inference‘s administrative reins, I am once again in charge and am reviving this site as a news feed / conversation forum for formal epistemologists. Please see the official announcement and new changes here. Also, I’d encourage everyone to check out the new site, as well as C&I’s new Facebook and Twitter feeds!
Submissions for the Young Epistemologist Prize 2019 are due 10 November 2018. To be eligible for the Young Epistemologist Prize, you must have a Ph.D. by the time of the submission of the paper but not earlier than six years prior to the date of the conference. Details here.
The REC 2019 will take place 3-4 May 2019. Speakers include Alex Byrne, Anil Gupta, Jonathan Kvanvig, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, and Susanna Rinard. All our welcome. More details here.
The Spanish Philosophy journal teorema is pleased to announce an essay com-petition for young scholars. The winner will receive 1500.00 €, and the essay will be published and acknowledged as winner in the journal.
Topic: Knowledge-First Epistemology and Decision Theory.
According to a recent idea developed by the approach known as “knowledge-first epistemology”, the evidence available to a subject at a time t consists of the propositions the subject knows. Together with the view that the rationality of an action is a matter of the evidence available to the agent, the result is that rational action requires knowledge. Is this a defensible view of rational action? If it is not, what is the connection between rational action and belief? Does rational action require rational belief? Does it require less than that: is perhaps mere belief sufficient to rationalize action? More generally, what are the connections between justification, rationality and excusability of both actions and beliefs?
Applicants must be under 35 on the closing date of the competition. Entries must be in English or Spanish, and not exceed 8000 words in length, notes and references included. All entries will be deemed submissions to teorema, and all quality submissions will be considered for publication. Entries must not have been published before, or be under consideration by other journals.
All entries, prepared for blind review, will be submitted electronically both in doc and pdf format, and addressed to the Editor, indicating “teorema Essay Prize” in the subject heading.
Entries will be judged by a panel of reputed scholars appointed by teorema. Their decision will be final.
Address for submissions: email@example.com
Closing date: 1st November, 2017
Guest Editor: Rodrigo Borges, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, PUCRS.
Special Issue Description: This special issue aims at updating the philosophical scholarship on knowledge and justification with new, cutting edge work in epistemology. Although the analysis of knowledge and justification has been an obsession of epistemologists since Plato’s Theaetetus, much progress can still be made in our understanding of how those concepts relate to other epistemological concepts (e.g., does knowing entail safety?) and to each other (e.g., does knowledge entail justification?). This special issue is searching for work featuring new perspectives on these and other issues of interest such as the regress problem, the internalism/externalism debate, Cartesian skepticism, the question of whether knowledge is a mental state different from belief, and the question of whether justification/knowledge is partially determined by pragmatic factors.
Appropriate Topics for Submission include, among others:
• epistemic internalism;
• epistemic externalism;
• epistemic justification;
• perceptual justification/knowledge;
• inferential justification/knowledge;
• epistemic norms;
• ancient skepticism;
• cartesian skepticism;
• Moore’s paradox;
• cognitive virtues/vices;
• knowledge as a mental state;
• fallibilism vs. infallibilism;
• the easy knowledge problem;
• knowledge from falsehood;
• pragmatic encroachment;
• know how;
• the epistemological role of intuitions.
For further information, please contact the guest editor: epistemen[at]gmail.com
The deadline for submissions is: September 1st, 2017.
St. Louis, MO, September 15-16, 2017.
The Midwest Epistemology Workshop (MEW) aims to advance interest in epistemology by organizing an annual workshop for the presentation and discussion of current work in the field. MEW also aims to establish a sense of community among epistemologists in the region that stimulates new research, improves its quality, and facilitates its dissemination. To this end, the workshop will be organized to encourage as much discussion and interaction as possible among the participants. Although workshops will typically be hosted by a college or university in the Midwest, all philosophers with an interest in epistemology are invited and encouraged to attend.
Saint Louis University will be hosting the 11th annual meeting of the Midwest Epistemology Workshop on Sept 15 – Sept 16, 2017.
Keynote and other Invited Speakers
Our keynote speaker will be Katalin Farkas from Central European University.
Tim Crane, also now at Central European University, will give a second special talk this year.
Our speakers for the regular program are:
Kathryn Lindeman (Saint Louis University)
Jon Kvanvig (Washington University in St. Louis)
Bruce Russell (Wayne State)
Stephen Biggs (Iowa State)
Julianne Chung (Louisville)
There is a website for the conference as well.
The winners of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2017 are:
Christopher Kelp (KU Leuven): “Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge”
Miriam Schoenfield (NYU/MIT): “Permissivism and the Value of Rationality”
The papers will be presented at the Rutgers Epistemology Conference, May 5 & 6 and will be published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. All are welcome to attend the Rutgers Epistemology Conference. Details about the conference can be found here: http://www.susannaschellenberg.org/Rutgers_Epistemology_Conference/Program.html
The 8th Annual Notre Dame/Northwestern Graduate Epistemology Conference will take place on April 28-29th, 2017, at the University of Notre Dame. This year, our keynote speaker is Peter Graham (U.C. Riverside).
The deadline for submissions is February 15, 2017. We welcome submissions in the field of analytic epistemology, broadly construed. Papers may be on any topic in epistemology. Papers should be no more than 4000 words (approx. 13 pages), excluding notes. Submissions longer than 4000 words will not be considered; please include a word count on your paper.
Papers should be prepared for blind review: include detachable cover page with paper’s title, abstract, author’s name, mailing address, email, phone number, and school affiliation; please omit any self-identifying remarks within the body of the paper. Papers should be emailed as an attached PDF to the conference organizers at firstname.lastname@example.org.
PhilEvents link: https://philevents.org/event/show/28406