Does the contextualist seek to dissolve disputes over skepticism? And does she use a “perfectly general strategy” for doing so? Is she not interested in, or not addressing, the traditional topic of whether we really know things, instead addressing how the word “know” should be used? Is she engaged in philosophy of language instead of epistemology? Is she addressing the more important types of skeptic? And what are those? Are key aspects of her position inexpressible, by her own lights? Is she subject to a “factivity problem”? These and other questions are answered in this draft of my 4th chapter of the book I’ve been working on. Please let me know if there are other pressing worries I don’t address, or if there’s some problem with some of my answers.
For my part, I’ll be happy if I just never again have to hear anything like “The contextualist only answers the high standards skeptic.”
Oh, I forgot:
I suppose one question I don’t explicitly address here is whether I construe myself as
doing “ordinary language philosophy.” I’m not sure what that would be, or if I’m doing
it, but at and around the top of p. 24, I am explaining/defending one aspect of my
approach that I suppose could be construed as a way that I have at least partly taken
some “linguistic turn.”