At the Brains Blog, on topics of interest to epistemologists.
A list of her posts can be found here.
The University of Edinburgh is pleased to announce a call for papers for the 5th Annual Edinburgh Graduate Epistemology Conference (27th-28th May 2015). Our keynote speakers this year will be Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford) and Jennifer Nagel (Toronto). All graduate presentations will have respondents from faculty members at Edinburgh or a neighbouring university.
We are inviting graduate students to submit essays within any area of epistemology (broadly construed). Essays should be approximately 4000 words, and should be anonymised for blind review.
We would really like the conference to be representative of the graduate community and so we strongly encourage submissions from anyone working on epistemology who is a member of an under-represented group.
We will be happy to help arrange childcare for any attendees who would find it helpful. Please feel free to get in touch to discuss this, or any accessibility requirements you may have.
The deadline for submissions is 1st March 2015. For more information, including details of how to submit, please visit our conference page.
This conference is generously sponsored by the Eidyn Research Centre and the University of Edinburgh, and is supported by the Edinburgh Women in Philosophy Group.
A super brief summary of eight key findings from recent research.
The Spanish Philosophy journal teorema is pleased to announce an essay competition for young scholars. The winner will receive 1500€, and the essay will be published and acknowledged as winner in the journal.
Topic: Belief Without Evidence
(further information below the fold)
Some folks might be interested to know that my book, Truth, is now available from Polity Press. It’s a generally non-technical survey focused issues of objectivity, the nature of truth, and the value of truth, meant to be suitable for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate level courses. Details at http://www.politybooks.com/book.asp?ref=0745663230
By the incomparable Marilynne Robinson. The first of several, but here is an interesting modal ambiguity I hadn’t noticed before:
“The door might have opened, and a woman might have called after them, Where are you going with that child? and then, after a minute, closed the door again, as if she had done all decency required.”
Associated with Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion are two prize competitions: The Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Religion (SPPR) and the OSPR Graduate Student Essay Prize (GSEP).
The winning entries for 2014 are:
SPPR Winner: Ross Inman, St. Louis University, “Omnipresence and the Location of the Immaterial”
GSEP: Dustin Crummett, University of Notre Dame, “Sufferer-Centered Requirements on Theodicy and All Things Considered Harms”
Congratulations to both on these well-deserved recognitions!
Call for Papers: Formal Epistemology Workshop 2015
May 20-22, 2015 (Wednesday to Friday)
Washington University in St. Louis
Tom Kelly (Princeton), Jeff Horty (University of Maryland, College Park)
The Formal Epistemology Workshop will be held in connection with the 2015 meeting of the St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR), which will take place immediately before, from May 17-19, 2015.
There will be conference sessions all day on May 20 & 21, and in the morning on May 22.
Contributors are invited to send full papers (suitable for presenting as a 40 minute talk) to firstname.lastname@example.org by Friday, January 16, 2015. Papers should be accompanied by abstracts of up to 300 words. Identifying information about the author(s) including obvious self-citations) should be removed from the body of the paper, but the name (and any other relevant information) should be included in the text of the e-mail.
Submissions should be prepared for anonymous review. Initial evaluation will be done anonymously. The final program will be selected with an eye towards maintaining diversity, so graduate students, people outside the tenure track, women, and members of underrepresented minorities are particularly encouraged to submit papers. Submitting the same paper to both FEW and SLACRR is permitted (though the organizers will coordinate the paper selection in order to ensure that the same paper doesn’t get presented at both conferences).
Final selection of the contributed talks will be made by March 31, 2015.
There will be childcare available for conference participants who bring their children. It will be provided on site by a local certified childcare provider.
Organizers: Kenny Easwaran (Texas A&M), Julia Staffel (Washington University in St. Louis), Mike Titelbaum (UW Madison)
Conference webpage: https://sites.google.com/site/juliastaffelphilosophy/few
Consider this case:
When Maxwell arrives at work in the morning, he always parks in one of two spots: C8 or D8. Half the time he parks in C8, and half the time he parks in D8. Today Maxwell parked in C8. It’s lunchtime at work. Maxwell and his assistant are up in the archives room searching for a particular document. Maxwell says, “I might have left the document in my car.” The assistant asks, “Mr. Maxwell, is your car parked in space C8? It’s not unheard of for cars to be stolen.” Maxwell thinks carefully for a moment and then responds, “No, my car has not been stolen. It is parked in C8.”
Which of the following options best describes Maxwell?
The epistemic closure principle says, roughly, that if one knows that P, and one knows that if P then Q, and one infers Q, then one knows Q. Some philosophers, most notably Robert Nozick and Fred Dretske, reject the closure principle. However, many epistemologists have claimed that rejecting closure is extremely counterintuitive and radically revisionary. Related to these claims, philosophers have also claimed that conjunctive assertions suggesting a violation of closure are “abominable” and “repugnant.”
So if conventional wisdom in epistemology is correct, then when people consider the question about Maxwell above, the intuitively best answer will not be option 3. Instead, option 3 should seem absurd.
However, as reported in a paper forthcoming in Philosophers’ Imprint, when I tested this case, it turned out that option 3 was viewed as the best option: nearly two-thirds of participants selected it.
We see a similar pattern if we just ask people whether (A) Maxwell knows that his car is parked in the lot, and (B) Maxwell knows that his car has not been stolen. Roughly 80% of people agree with A, while only about 35% of people agree with B.
In light of these results, it seems that closure-denying conjunctions don’t actually strike people as absurd. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that rejecting the epistemic closure principle actually is revisionary.
October 17-18, 2014; Ann Arbor, MI; Location: Assembly Hall, Rackham Building
On October 17-18 the University of Michigan Philosophy Department will be hosting the 8th Annual Midwest Epistemology Workshop. The featured speakers will be Deborah Tollefsen, Memphis; Chris Pincock, Ohio State; Ishani Maitra, Michigan; John Bengson, Wisconsin; Eileen Nutting, Kansas; Susanna Rinard, Missouri-KC/Harvard; Jeremy Fantl, Calgary; and the keynote speaker David Christensen, Brown. (See the full schedule below the fold.)