This is for an Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity, and is due to Daniel Star sometime in April, so I thought I’d link to the draft here, in case any want to help me by providing comments! You can … Continue reading
I’d be interested to hear people’s thoughts on the following question. Why does classical foundationalism claim that basic beliefs are epistemically privileged in the sense that they are indubitable, infallible, indefeasible, and so on? Roughly speaking, foundationalism is the view … Continue reading
This past semester, I tried an experiment: I Beamer-ed up my entire epistemology course, so I thought I’d make the slides public. (For LaTeX-uninitiated, Beamer is a LaTeX class for creating slide presentations.) Some of the material on the slides … Continue reading
Oxford is beginning a large venture, to create selective bibliographies across disciplines of important topics in each discipline. Duncan Pritchard is editing the philosophy section, and I’m not sure who else is on the editorial board, but as part of … Continue reading
Frege believed that the unrestricted comprehension axiom is true, and it is sad, since the axiom leads to paradox. If you are inclined toward coherentism, the rationality of Frege’s belief causes a problem, since it is logically inconsistent. I’ve been … Continue reading