My grad seminar this semester is on pragmatic encroachment–syllabus here, for those interested in what we are reading: Pragmatic Encroachment Seminar. Everything we are doing is stuff that gives me a reason to get up in the morning to do … Continue reading
This past semester, I tried an experiment: I Beamer-ed up my entire epistemology course, so I thought I’d make the slides public. (For LaTeX-uninitiated, Beamer is a LaTeX class for creating slide presentations.) Some of the material on the slides … Continue reading
I’ve got a good draft of a new paper up on my website, “Knowledge in Denial: A Defense of Nonskeptical Pure Invariantism.” I’d welcome any comments! Also just posted is a paper forthcoming in the exciting new journal International Journal … Continue reading
In his very interesting “Knowledge and Certainty” (Phil Issues, 2008), Jason says the following things to which we might want to refer later. A. “A person’s belief satisfies the property expressed by a subjective use of “certain” relative to a … Continue reading
In a recent thread (here), there was extensive discussion of Wesley Buckwalter’s experimental work on knowledge ascriptions. Buckwalter’s work seems to support an emerging consensus in experimental philosophy, according to which the salience of error does affect people’s intuitions about … Continue reading
In a recent post, Keith DeRose offers some nice criticisms of existing experimental studies of bank case intuitions, along with some very helpful suggestions about how future studies should be conducted. Wesley Buckwalter has now completed a new study that … Continue reading
Here is the paper I gave at the Oberlin Philosophy Colloquium last month. In it I discuss recent experimental work relevant to (or at least often enough taken to be relevant to) epistemic contextualism. I believe the papers for that … Continue reading
Cases used to motivate contextualism or the denial of what Jason Stanley calls “intellectualism” are often referred to as “stakes-shifting cases” or “standards-shifting cases.” Typically, such cases tend to go schematically, like this: LOW, for whom not much hinges on … Continue reading
Joshua Knobe and I have just drafted a paper discussing the empirical evidence for a contrastive model of knowledge ascriptions. The paper offers a review of the existing empirical research, and introduces several new experiments of our own. It then … Continue reading
From initial submission to acceptance, this one took eleven months. That’s not bad at all. But as many of you know, it sure seems like it takes forever, even when things move rapidly by journal standards. Now finally the wait … Continue reading