I still find it hard to believe that anyone would want to deny this, but it happens. 🙂
The Knowledge Entails Evidence Argument (KEE)
1. Knowing entails believing as one ought.
2. Believing as one ought entails believing what fits ones evidence.
3. Thus knowing entails believing what fits one’s evidence.
I’m not sure I believe 1, but I’m not particularly opposed to it, and it seems like the thing fans of knowledge would like.
2 doesn’t even say that believing what fits the evidence is sufficient for believing as one ought, only that it is necessary for it. I think it sounds weird to say S’s evidence points to not-p, but she’s believing just as she ought by believing p. Here’s a more formal presentation of that idea.
The Knowledge and Normativity Reductio (KNR)
1. Suppose for reductio that knowledge does not entail evidential justification.
2. If 1, then possibly, S knows p though her evidence all points to not-p, even after perfectly virtuous inquiry,
3. If all S’s evidence points to not-p after perfectly virtuous inquiry, then S should believe not-p.
4. So if 1—modulo the seemingly undeniable 3—possibly, S knows p though S should believe not-p.
I think 4 would spell trouble for friends of the value of knowledge. At the very least, I’m much more concerned about what I should believe than what I happen to know.