Here’s an idea I want to try out on the problem of the truth connection. By way of background, there are several approaches one might take toward this problem that are problematic. One might hold, for example, that justification entails truth, but that approach founders on the possibility of justified false beliefs. One might also hold that justification makes for objective likelihood of truth, but that approach has difficulty with the new evil demon problem.
So why not just say the following? When a total body of evidence justifies one in believing a proposition p (in the way required for knowledge), that body of evidence also justifies one in thinking that the belief in question is the appropriate belief to hold in the interests of getting to the truth and avoiding error. Put in shorthand, the total body of evidence not only justifies believing the claim in question, but also justifies believing that the belief is epistemically justified. (As an aside, I think there are hints of such a view in Chisholm’s 2nd ed. of Theory of Knowledge.)
This is enough to distinguish epistemic justification from other kinds of justification, such as practical or moral justification. It also ties epistemic justification to truth in a way that belief itself is not tied to truth (Some think that to believe a claim is to believe it is true, and so, too, to justifiably believe a claim is to justifiably believe that it is true–but here the connection to truth merely piggy-backs on a purported connection between belief and truth.)
Some will remain dissatisfied that there this connection doesn’t imply that the belief in question is objectively likely to be true. That I admit, but the advantage is that this view faces no new evil demon problem. So, my question is whether anyone sees additional problems for the view, besides the obvious lack just noted.