I’ve posted a long paper, “The (Mostly Harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Attributions.” It argues for a fourth alternative to contextualism, invariantism, and relativism: that knowledge-talk is governed by inconsistent inference-principles, but that these principles rarely lead us into contradiction. In fact, we can almost always assign an effective content to knowledge attributions even if their absolute content is self-contradictory. (The “effective content”/”absolute content” distinction is borrowed from Anil Gupta’s work on inconsistent discourses, which I draw on heavily.) So there is no reason to abandon knowledge-talk, even if it is inconsistent.
Pretty much the first thing I did after putting the paper up was to surf on over here and see Keith’s post, which seems quite relevant, since my paper compares and contrasts the inconsistency view with a version of contextualism on which an attribution of standards is always implicit (if often unvoiced).
Anyway, comments are of course welcome.