I am always looking for ways to connect epistemology to other subfields of philosophy (esp. within the “M” side of M&E). Here’s one I’ve been thinking of for some time.
If testimonial belief is to be knowledge, it must satisfy the anti-luck condition on knowledge. There are, it seems, (at least) three sources for luck to enter into the picture in a typical testimonial exchange: the testimony itself, though true, might be only luckily so (as when based on a guess); the recipient might be lucky in having accepted what in fact is solid testimony (as when one just happens upon the one truth-teller in a room full of expert liars); or the recipient might be lucky in having recovered the attested proposition (as when one didn’t really catch what was said, but guessed correctly). Of these the first two have been explored at length in the literature on the epistemology of testimony; the third not so.
(more: click on p 2 below)