New Study: No Difference in Gettier Intuition Across Cultures

Within the more metaphilosophically-oriented literature on experimental philosophy, there has been a great deal of discussion of the philosophical implications of cross-cultural differences in intuitions about Gettier cases. This work has been extremely impressive from a purely philosophical perspective, but … Continue reading

Truth-insensitive epistemology: radical or commonsense?

Many philosophers endorse a truth-insensitivity hypothesis: certain core, philosophically important evaluative properties of a belief are insensitive to whether it is true. For example, if two possible agents believe the same proposition for the same reason, then either both are … Continue reading

Out with the old …

… skeptical arguments. A new paper of mine, “Skeptical Appeal: The Source-Content Bias” (forthcoming in Cognitive Science),¬†uncovers a subtle mechanism that triggers knowledge-denial and contributes to the appeal of classic skeptical arguments. The mechanism is an interaction between two factors. … Continue reading

Empirical Tests of Interest-Relative Invariantism

According to advocates of Interest-Relative Invariantism (or pragmatic encroachment), whether or not someone knows something at a time (or has evidence for it) depends in part on what is at stake for that person at that time in acting on … Continue reading

Experimental Epistemology in NYC

I wanted to alert readers of this blog to upcoming experimental philosophy talks in New York City. Many of the talks this semester will be of interest to epistemologists, including our first two talks, Jonathan Schaffer’s, “Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes”, … Continue reading