I am using Charity Anderson’s forthcoming Phil Studies paper on fallibilism and epistemic modality for my fallibilism seminar this semester and we discussing some of her work in progress in which she suggests that issues pertaining to the fallibility of … Continue reading
Let’s say that the mentalist about evidence believes the following supervenience thesis:
M: Necessarily, if A and B are in the same non-factive mental states from the cradle to the grave, A and B will share the same evidence from the cradle to the grave.
Here’s an argument against mentalism, so understood:
(1) We have non-inferential knowledge of the external world.
(2) If we know p non-inferentially, p is part of our evidence.
(3) If ~p, p is not part of our evidence.
(4) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and believe mistakenly that p.
(5) We know p non-inferentially.
(C) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and while p will not be part of their evidence, p will be part of ours.