Sosa criticizes Foley’s theory here, but I think the criticism misunderstands Foley’s theory. Sosa says:
About Foley’s stance, it does provide a unifying connection to truth if only via the requirement of a deep commitment to the T principles, which speak of truth and not only of justification. This sense of justification, Foley-rationality, is plausibly epistemic. It amounts to conforming to one’s own deep epistemic standards. But a believer might conceivably have standards that are epistemically quite deplorable no matter how deep, as would someone deeply committed to the dicta of astrology. But the point can also be made without recourse to what is only hypothetically so, in some remote possible world. Deepest standards for belief regulation in our actual world can have functions that bear less on truth than on solidarity and coordination, as with some primitive myths, which seem plausibly to require nothing short of belief if they are to satisfy their latent functions. Can it plausibly be supposed that it is nevertheless their sheer depth that gives the relevant standards epistemic efficacy? Surely there must be some further sense of justification that matters in epistemology.
There are two criticisms here, and one of them is fair, in the sense that it addresses what Foley actually claims. But the other doesn’t, I think. Sosa considers standards of belief regulation aimed at goals other than the truth: at solidarity and coordination, for example. Here I think the criticism is directed at a theory that is not Foley’s. As I recall, Foley’s theory adverts to one’s deepest standards for pursuing the goal of getting to the truth and avoiding error now, not just one’s deepest standards, irrespective of the goal. If my memory is correct, then this criticism is misplaced.
The other criticism remains however, but some clarification is needed to make it apply to Foley’s theory. For Foley, one’s standards have to do with the argument forms one accepts, and the dicta of astrology do not count as argument forms. There is the aspect of Foley’s view that makes it foundationalist, where some claims are acceptable without argument at all, and here the criticism might have a bit more bite, since it could be that a person’s deepest standards allowed for acceptance of the dicta of astrology without argument.
Notice, however, that Sosa doesn’t conclude that Foley’s account would be mistaken if it counted such dicta as justified (or rational). Instead, the only conclusion he endorses is that there must be some other sense of justification that matters in epistemology. I’m inclined to be Occamist about multiplying senses of terms in epistemology and elsewhere beyond necessity, so I’d like an explanation why something further is needed in epistemology. What role does the concept of justification play in epistemology that Foley’s latitudinarian theory can’t play? Here’s an idea: if you add true belief to Foley-rationality, together with a suitable response to the Gettier problem, you’ll have a theory of knowledge still subject to counterexample. Is there a good argument for this conclusion? I’d be surprised to see such an argument; in fact, I think there’s a good argument that this claim is false. So that leads me to wonder what other grounds one would cite to justify multiplying senses of justification.
Here’s an idea: Foley’s account doesn’t explain enough of our intuitions, and violates too many others, to be a complete account of justification (rationality). But if this is the reason, isn’t it a reason to conclude, not that there is another sense of justification, but rather that Foley’s theory is simply wrong? That’s the way it seems to me.