Some Papers on Perception and Givenness

If you have seen the syllabus for the Fodor and Peacocke course on Representations taught last spring at NYU, here’s the link. There are quite interesting papers linked from this page by Fodor and Brandom and others on perception and givenness.


Some Papers on Perception and Givenness — 1 Comment

  1. The collection of papers is impressive! I read Campbellâ??s wonderful paper on â??Manipulating Colourâ?? (which I never managed to access on the web before), and I fully agree with his stressing the role of practical experience in the formation and justification of our naïve color-concept. And with his criticism of reason-based views.
    I am a bit puzzled about his use of the label â??error theoryâ??. He tells us that Locke has criticized the naïve color concept, and adds that â??those who have followed Locke in holding that there are only the microphysical structures and the tendencies to produce experiences in us have often also agreed that there is an error that we naively fall into here: that of supposing that colours are categorical or intrinsic properties of objects, displayed to us in vision.â?? After which, he seems to apply the label â??error theoristâ?? almost for everyone who does not endorse the full-blooded naïve color concept.
    Now, I thought that classical Lockean dispositionalist is to large extent friendly to the naïve perceiver, and tries to salvage as much objectivity of color as scientifically possible. She does ascribe some error to the naïve perceiver (and some understandable and venial error for that), but is far from a full-blown projectivism which denies the existence of color-in-the-objects. I thought such full blown projectivism is really error-theory.
    Or am I wrong about terminology and/or Campbellâ??s line?

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