Sometimes we defer in opinion. When we should so defer is an interesting question, but here’s one possibility I haven’t seen discussed. Should we defer to ourselves? Consider the following deference principle:
Self-Deference: C-me-now(p/C-me-now(p) = x) = x.
This principle says that my present credence for p, conditional on that credence being x, is x.
Perhaps one might even think of Self-Deference as a constitutive rule of rationality: if you violate Self-Deference, you are automatically irrational. You might even think of Self-Deference as expressing a minimal amount of self-trust needed for rationality.
Maybe not, though. Do you really think that your credences are always appropriate? Presumably not. So you think that for some values for p, the credence you should assign to p differs from what you actually assign to p. So you think that for some values of p:
Normative Non-Self-Deference: C-me-now(p/C-me-now(p) = x) should not be x.
So, you are committed to the view that it is OK to satisfy:
Non-Self-Deference: C-me-now(p/C-me-now(p) = x) = y (where y is not equal to x).
And perhaps you actually have some conditional credences that satisfy Non-Self-Deference. Perhaps, for example, you view yourself as being too confident whenever you hear a neat aphormism and consider the claim that it is one of Ben Franklin’s. Maybe you are even so bold as to have a measure of your degree of overconfidence. So your credence, say, that aphorism X is Ben’s is .7, conditional on your credence that it is Ben’s is .6.
There’s a dutch book result related to this, but it takes some other assumptions, so I’ll stop here for now and post about it later. So what goes wrong in this argument, if anything?