I’ve argued in a recent paper (see here or here) that remembering that p entails knowing that p. If this is so, then remembering that p should not be present in Gettier cases, which is what we find. Here is an example I use:
“I take my students by a field where I know that there are no sheep, but there is a sheep-shaped rock that, from the road, looks exactly like a real sheep. I also know that there is a lone sheep on the far side of the field, well out of sight. I see that one of my students has caught her eye on the sheep-shaped rock, and I hear her say to herself, ‘What a happy looking sheep in that field!’ I snicker and say quietly to myself, ‘She doesn’t know that there’s a sheep in that field.’ Later, when we arrive at our destination, I ask, ‘Does anybody remember whether there were any sheep in the field we drove by?’ The same student says, ‘Yeah, I remember that there was a sheep in the field.’ I judge her and say quietly to myself, ‘She doesn’t remember that there was a sheep in the field.’ In this scenario, my final statement seems true, despite the fact that she has a justified, true belief that there was a sheep in the field. It is by sheer accident that she has a true belief.”
I argue this against claims/arguments made by Sven Bernecker in his recent book (2010, p. 74), who thinks both that remembering does not entail knowing and also that one can remember in Gettier cases.
I’m interested in whether we remember in Ginet’s old fake barn cases. Suppose I am in fake barn country and I happen to only walk by the one real barn in that country. Later, I have the belief that that was a nice barn. Do I remember that that was a nice barn?
I’m a little more inclined to say “yes” than in my above fake sheep Gettier case. But I’m also inclined to think that I also knew that that was a nice barn. Recently, probably due to protests by philosophers like Keith DeRose, Ruth Millikan, and others, there has been more skepticism about the lack of knowledge in fake barn cases.
Personally, I’m mixed, and my intuitions go both ways. Here’s my hope. Those who have the intuition that there is no knowledge will also have the intuition that there is no remembering. And those who have the intuition that there is knowledge will also have the intuition that there is remembering. I think that is so for me. I ask Certain Doubts readers, is that the case for you?
(Thanks to Dustin Locke for first raising the fake barn version of the case to me.)