I couldn’t decide whether to post this here, at PEA Soup, or both. So, I posted it at PEA Soup and thought I’d post a link here instead of double posting. Some regular commentators comment both places, but many do not. I’ve written up a post that concerns matters epistemic, matters practical, and their interface and I’d love to know what the epistemologists have to say about this. So, if you’d do me the favor of heading over to PEA Soup, I’d love some feedback.
The issue has to do with the relation between the normative standing of a normative judgment and the actions that judgment rationalizes. The view that it’s permissible to act on p when it’s permissible to believe p (or something in the neighborhood) seems to be gaining some traction, but those who defend this view end up saying things they shouldn’t say. Whereas I think this sort of principle is useful in showing that there cannot be false, justified beliefs (here), this tends not to be the view shared by others. Maybe they don’t have my intuitions about the moral significance of outcomes the agent could not have predicted. I’m trying out something different. So, feedback would be great (here). Go talk to the ethicists. It will be like that time on Lost.