New Paper on Epistemic Normativity and Value-Driven Epistemology

Here.

The motivation for the paper is my attraction to value-driven epistemology, which I’ve endorsed in the abstract, but never tried to use to actually do some epistemology. Here I try, at least. And the draft is, let us say, drafty, and any help closing the holes would be appreciated!


Comments

New Paper on Epistemic Normativity and Value-Driven Epistemology — 2 Comments

  1. You got an illuminating and exciting work here!
    I have some doubts, and one of them is the following: when it comes to the “beastly dimension” of normativity,is it really the case that no rational sense can be made of the link between inputs and outputs? More specifically, it could be argued that there is not only the referred causal interaction between the input and the resultant belief, but also a relation of conditional probability between them: the belief is probably true conditional on the given input. Add to this the thesis that being epistemically rational means optimizing the epistemic goal and there you have the missing link. So, the answer to the question: “Why believing there is a bengal tiger near is an appropriate doxastic response to the sensory experience of a bengal tiger?”, would be that the experience not only is causally connected with the belief in question, but also makes it probable to a high degree. Couldn’t it do the job? If the answer is ‘no’, why not? (I thing this qualifies as an ‘specific story’ of the epistemic appropriateness)

  2. Luis, this is a good point here about what I need to say more carefully. The key is the guidance function between input and output, and we want one that makes sense from the perspective of the agent in question. So conditional probability alone won’t help with that and neither will causation. The best possibility would be in terms of content, whether propositional or not. That’s what I was aiming for (though I’d be happy to have causation and conditional probability in the story too).

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