In a recent post, Keith DeRose offers some nice criticisms of existing experimental studies of bank case intuitions, along with some very helpful suggestions about how future studies should be conducted.
Wesley Buckwalter has now completed a new study that incorporates all of DeRose’s suggestions. Yet, though the methodology is now more sophisticated, the result remains exactly the same. Once again, one finds that explicitly mentioning certain error possibilities can impact people’s intuitions but that there is no difference between high stakes and low stakes.
At this point, then, we have a whole series of different experimental studies on the bank cases (here, here, here and here), and they all seem to be converging on the same basic result: one can sometimes change people’s intuitions by making error possibilities salient, but one can’t alter people’s intuitions by changing the stakes.
I would be very interested to hear any thoughts about the epistemological significance of these experimental results. What bearing might they have on debates about contextualism, interest-relative invariantism, etc.?