Morton on Knowing What to Think About

Here’s a new paper by Adam, entitled Knowing What to Think About: When Epistemology Meets the Theory of Choice. Adam is the most recent addition to our list of contributors as well, and the paper, on my first cursory glance, appears to be about the issues involved in refusing to bracket desires and values when doing epistemology and refusing to bracket beliefs when doing decision theory. The essay is slated to appear in a new volume published by Oxford entitled Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Hetherington.

UPDATE: I’ve unlinked the paper temporarily; Adam is going to send a different version and would like it linked instead. I’ll note it when the new version is in place.

UPDATE: The new version is now in place, so the link works again.


Morton on Knowing What to Think About — 3 Comments

  1. One quick and small thought, Adam: I would have thought that William James is the source of the talk of getting to the truth and avoiding error, and the way in which they compete with each other, but I can’t recall the exact place. There’s his nice language, though, about the person who proclaims, “Better to go without belief forever than believe something false…”, and James’s apt remark that such an attitude shows a private, preponderant horror of being duped.

  2. I don’t know if this question has already been resolved in the new draft, but it’s the beginning of Section VII of “The Will To Believe”:

    Believe truth! Shun error!-these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life.

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