More x-phi evidence on stakes

In a recent thread (here), there was extensive discussion of Wesley Buckwalter’s experimental work on knowledge ascriptions. Buckwalter’s work seems to support an emerging consensus in experimental philosophy, according to which the salience of error does affect people’s intuitions about knowledge, but the magnitude of the stakes does not affect intuitions.

In the comments, there was discussion of one experiment–due to N. Ángel Pinillos–which seemed to buck the trend and support stakes sensitivity (for more on Pinillos’s experiment, click here). Buckwalter, along with Joshua Knobe, has now run a variant of the Pinillos experiment replacing “know” with “believe”, and found that the stakes sensitivity survives the replacement: “As predicted there was a main effect for stakes F (1, 86) = 23.1, p <.001, but unfortunately no significant differences for the predicate used, or the interaction of these factors.” How does this affect the case for stakes sensitivity? For those interested in continuing the discussion, please join the discussion thread on Experimental Philosophy, here

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