Uriah has an interesting post here on Desert Landscapes about appearances. He says that there are de re and de dicto reports of appearances, as follows:
It appears that a is F (de dicto)
a appears to be F (de re)
He says that (this is a correction from a previous version) the former entails the latter.
I would have thought, though, that the former does not entail the latter because it doesn’t require that a exist. But perhaps together with the claim that a exists we get the entailment.
I have one reservation still. Perhaps the de re reading carries with it the information that there is a causal/explanatory connection between a and whatever system is appeared to F-ly. Perhaps it says that the object a is causally relevant in some way to some appearance state involving the property F. If that is so, then it would take more than the de dicto reading together with a’s existence to imply the de re reading.