A quick case for “No”: in philosophy we aim to think for ourselves, and as such we do not — and we should not — rely on the authority of another philosopher in coming to a conclusion.
I am very tempted by this quick case. But I have a certain uneasiness about it. People in other disciplines regularly defer to their within-disipline colleagues, on matters where they regard their within-discipline colleagues as having relevant expertise. In so doing they recognize the importance of shared knowledge (or at least well-justified belief) regarding the common world they and their colleagues inhabit. I worry that if we deny that there is expertise within philosophy — that is, if we deny the sort of thing that would justify one philosopher in reaching a philosophical conclusion on the basis of accepting what one of her philosopher-colleagues told her — this reflects an attitude that rejects the very idea that one philosopher could have (and be seen by others to have) more philosophical knowledge than another. Such an attitude might be based on the view that there is no knowledge to be had in our discipline in the first place (a depressing thought); or else on the view that within philosophy no one can lay claim to the sort of knowledge/justified belief required by expertise (but what is it about our discipline and its subject-matter that precludes this?).
And yet: the practice of accepting a philosophical claim merely because philosopher X (known to be sharp) said so strikes me as deeply unphilosophical. (Possible exception: results in logic and the more formal parts of philosophy.)
Anyway, this is a worry I’ve been having since giving a paper on a related topic at the first Midwest Epistemology Workshop.