Steven Reynolds’ interesting comments on my earlier post regarding knowledge being the norm of assertion prompt the following query. At one point, Williamson considers the idea that assertion is to belief as outer is to inner. If so, then we should expect that if knowledge is the norm of assertion, then knowledge is also the norm of belief.
Why would anyone think that, however? Ralph, in one of the threads, considers the idea that there is a sense of what we “should belief” which is such that we should believe p iff p. If knowledge is the norm of belief, then the left-to-right reading would be true, but not the right-to-left reading. Moreover, the commonplace acknowledgement of fallibilists that justified false beliefs are possible entails that knowledge is not the norm of belief–to have a justified belief is to have a belief regarding which one has done nothing wrong from a purely cognitive point of view. It’s not just that one is not blameworthy for the belief–that’s a weaker concept than the concept of justification.
Of course, many of the most interesting ideas in philosophy begin by climbing the mountain of counterintuitiveness, and maybe that’s the case here?