Invariantism, Pyrrho and Austin

I’ve got a good draft of a new paper up on my website, “Knowledge in Denial: A Defense of Nonskeptical Pure Invariantism.” I’d welcome any comments!

Also just posted is a paper forthcoming in the exciting new journal International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, “Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory.”

Abstracts below the fold.

“Knowledge in Denial”

Epistemic invariantism is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions don’t vary across contexts. Epistemic purism is the view that purely practical factors can’t directly affect the strength of your epistemic position. The combination of purism and invariantism, pure invariantism, is the received view in contemporary epistemology. It has lately been criticized by contextualists, who deny invariantism, and impurists, who deny purism. A central charge against pure invariantism is that it poorly accommodates linguistic intuitions about certain cases. In this paper I develop a new response to this charge. I propose that pure invariantists can explain the relevant linguistic intuitions on the grounds that they track the propriety of indirect speech acts, in particular indirect requests and denials.

Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory”

This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.


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