Like most epistemologists, I find it intuitively unacceptable to say things like ‘I know that I won’t be run over by a bus later this month’. (How could I know that?)
Now, this intuition gives me a lot of trouble, because unfortunately for me, my various theoretical commitments make it hard for me to accept any of the familiar ways of accommodating this intuition. (Basically, these commitments seem to force me to say that this sentence will be true, in most ordinary contexts of utterance; so the only explanation that I can give for its apparent intuitive unacceptability is that uttering this sentence would be pragmatically misleading in some way.)
It’s just occurred to me that it also seems just as intuitively unacceptable to say ‘I have reason to believe that I won’t be run over by a bus later this month’. (Well, this might seem intuitively acceptable if I had some specific reason for believing this — such as that I knew that I would be spending all of the month trekking across a wilderness far away from any buses — but if my only reason for believing that I won’t be run over by a bus is that the probability of its happening is sufficiently low, then it seems intuitively unacceptable to utter this sentence.)
Do the other CD-ers share this intuition, I wonder? And if so, would those who hold that it is false, in most ordinary contexts of utterance, to say ‘I know that I won’t be run over by a bus later this month’ also think that the same goes for ‘I have reason to believe that I won’t be run over by a bus later this month’? How can we adapt the theories that imply that the former sentence is false in most ordinary contexts so that they also imply that the latter is false as well?