What evidential/motivational support relations do the following four claims (which all seem to be ‘internalist’ claims, in one sense or another) bear to one another?
1. Whether a person is justified in her doxastic attitude towards p (or whether a certain attitude towards p is justified for her) supervenes only on factors that are “internal to her perspective,” in some to-be-specified sense. (See John Greco’s essay in the book called Contemporary debates in Epistemology, Blackwell, 2005.)
2. The concept of justification is conceptually independent of the concept of truth; ‘S is justified in her doxastic attitude towards p’ (or ‘attitude D is justified for S’) can be defined without using the concept of truth. (See Chisholm’s definition of ‘internalism’ in Theory of Knowledge, which I think appears in all editions, certainly in the third.)
3. S is justified in her doxastic attitude towards p (or D is justified for her) only if S has evidence, reasons, or arguments that support the legitimacy of her adopting that doxastic attitude towards p. (See Ernest Sosa’s paper called “Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity,” in a 1994 Aristotelian Society Supplement.)
4. S is justified in her doxastic attitude towards p only if S is aware (i.e. believes) that the doxastic attitude she takes towards p is justified. (Mutatis mutandis for a necessary condition on D being justified, for her.)
I’m most interested in whether (4) is entailed or supported by any of (1) – (3). It seems that (1) entails (2), since whether a proposition is true is not a factor that is “internal to my perspective,” and it seems like (1) and (3) fit nicely together, since “evidence, reasons, or arguments” are things that are “internal to my perspective,” although I don’t think (1) entails (3), and (3) does not entail (1), since it only states a necessary condition on someone’s belief being justified. For the same reason (4) doesn’t entail (1).
Is this a way of going from (1) to (4)?
a. Suppose that factors “internal to my perspective” are factors that I am aware of, i.e. factors that I believe obtain, and which actually obtain.
b. Trivially, that my belief that p is justified is a factor upon which the fact that my belief that p is justified supervenes; whether my belief is justified depends (trivially) on whether it is justified.
c. From (1) and (b), it follows that I am justifed in my belief that p only if the fact that my belief that p is justified is internal to my perspective.
d. It is consequence of (a) that: the fact that my belief that p is justified is internal to my perspective only if I am aware that my belief that p is justified.
e. From (c) and (d), it follows that I am justifed in my belief that p only if I am aware that my belief that p is justified.