I am using Charity Anderson’s forthcoming Phil Studies paper on fallibilism and epistemic modality for my fallibilism seminar this semester and we discussing some of her work in progress in which she suggests that issues pertaining to the fallibility of faculties and methods is more basic than my evidential probability approach to epistemic possibility and fallibilism or at least that the evidential-probability approach only captures one dimension of fallibility. The paragraph below explains why I think the evidential probability approach covers *all possible* kinds of fallibility, but in a way that need not deny an important role for other notions of fallibility.
There may be some way in which fallibility of *faculties* is most basic (I’m not a fan of “methods” talk). But the relevance/impact of their fallibility on epistemic agents is measured in epistemic probabilities. Sensory faculties are just really close-to-me instruments. Some radon tester’s reliability rating is just some cold, third-person fact if I don’t have a basement. It doesn’t impact my epistemic agency, doesn’t show up on the screen. When I *use* that instrument–or a telescope or microscope or mass spectrometer or eyeball or ear or nose or whatever–its reliability is then relevant to my epistemic perspective and represented as an epistemic probability. So, faculties are “more basic” explanantes (plural of “explanans”) in the sense that they are a *source* of the epistemic probabilities. But my epistemic perspective is *constituted* by (phenomenal) evidence and best represented by epistemic probabilities.