The restrictive view that collapses the distinction between epistemic permission and epistemic obligation is at odds with most versions of coherentism, and there’s an interesting reason why, I think. Suppose we begin with the assumption that knowledge and justification ultimately depend on experience (at least causally), and then consider what the relationship between experience and belief must be in order for the restrictive view to be correct. In order for the restrictive view to be correct, there can’t be any kind of optionality about how to interpret experience, doxastically speaking. Coherentists, and Lehrer is a paradigmatic example here, usually think of the relationship as involving some kind of looseness or play. Lehrer puts the point something like this: there is experience, but then there is always what we make of it. It is this feature that leads to the “alternative systems” objection to coherentism, though it is hard to see why it is an objection unless you’ve already got a decisive argument for the restrictive view.
In any case, this slippage between experience and belief is harder to endorse if you think that experience justifies belief in virtue of some propositional content of the experience.
If, for example, your experience is correctly characterized as an experience as if p, then it is hard to see why this experience doesn’t justify just the belief that p. Of course, an experience can be manifold in terms of propositional content: it may be both an experience as if p and as if q. In such a case, it looks like it will justify believing that p and believing that q.
What it won’t do is justify believing any competitors of p and q, and that is the point needed by coherentists to defend the kind of looseness or play that allows for a denial of the restrictive view based on the idea of a distinction between experience and its interpretation. So it looks like (empiricistically inclined) coherentists who want to distinguish between epistemic permissions and epistemic obligations may need the view that the justificatory relationship between experience and belief does not depend on experience having propositional content.