Think of ethical internalism as a view that insists that moral beliefs and attitudes are intrinsically motivating. This kind of internalism/externalism issue has had little play in epistemology, and its absence is puzzling.
So suppose we distinguish epistemic principles from logico-inductive ones, as we find in Chisholm. Suppose we then consider the position that insists that e can’t be evidence for p for S unless S’s being aware of e or believing e inclines S to believe p; unless, that is, e’s presence in S’s noetic system is intrinsically motivating with regard to belief that p.
I’m leaving out lots of subtleties here, but the details aren’t my present concern, which is two-fold. First, would such a view be somehow a lot less plausible than the similar kind of internalism in ethics? Second, would that kind of internalism in epistemology somehow give grounds for thinking that evidential connections are nonfactive?