Epistemology at the Pacific Division Meeting

Below the fold are the epistemology offerings I noticed for the Central. If I missed something, please note it in the comments. (I only attended to the main program, so will have missed anything in the group meetings.)

As in past years, the premiere division meeting for epistemology is the Pacific, perhaps in part because of the size of the program. But maybe the other meetings should notice that part of the explanation may also be the desire to attend a conference that has a strong program in a place not susceptible to blizzards!

Wednesday:

1A Author-Meets-Critics: Brian Skyrms, Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Jeffrey Barrett (University of California–Irvine)
Critics: J. McKenzie Alexander (London School of Economics)
Steve Downes (University of Utah)
Peter Godfrey-Smith (Harvard University)
Gerhard Jäger (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen)
Author: Brian Skyrms (University of California–Irvine)

1E Invited Symposium: Perception and Imagination
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)
Speakers: Jennifer Church (Vassar College)
“Imagination and the Experience of Objectivity”
Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow)
“Perception and Imagination: Heavenly Vision and the Content of Experience”
Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp and University of Cambridge)
“Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery”

1J Colloquium: Puzzles and Paradoxes
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Geoff Georgi (University of Southern California)
Speaker: Alex Grzankowski (University of Texas–Austin)
“Antonymy in the Attitudes”
Commentator: Brandon Biggerstaff (University of California–Davis)
2:00-3:00
Chair: Adam Swenson (California State University–Northridge)
Speaker: John Brunero (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“Evidence, ‘Ought,’ and the Mine Shaft Paradox”
Commentator: Daniel Guevara (University of California–Santa Cruz)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Ann Levey (University of Calgary)
Speaker: Alex Baia (University of Texas–Austin)
“Surprise Exams Are Conditionally Possible”
Commentator: Alexander Jackson (Boise State University)

1K Colloquium: Rationality
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Carolyn Brighouse (Occidental College)
Speakers: Michael S. Brownstein (New Jersey Institute of Technology)
Alex Madva (Columbia University)
“Alief and Affordance: The Normativity of Automaticity”
Commentator: Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California–Riverside)
2:00-3:00
Chair: Rasmus Thybo Jensen (Københavns Universitet)
Speaker: Dustin Locke (Claremont McKenna College)
“Knowledge-Free Decision Theory”
Commentator: Jonathan Ichikawa (University of St. Andrews)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Alexandre Marcellesi (University of California–San Diego)
Speaker: Paul Weirich (University of Missouri)
“Decisions Without Sharp Probabilities”
Commentator: Roger Clarke (University of British Columbia)

2A Author-Meets-Critics: Raffaella De Rosa, Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Amy Schmitter (University of Alberta)
Critics: Alan Nelson (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Thomas Vinci (Dalhousie University)
Author: Raffaella De Rosa (Rutgers University–Newark)

2E Colloquium: Epistemology
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00
Chair: Chelsey Booth (University of Manitoba)
Speaker: Benjamin Lennertz (University of Southern California)
“Epistemic Modal Belief Reports Are a Problem for von Fintel and Gillies”
Commentator: Kai von Fintel (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Alex Bundy (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Speaker: Daniel Immerman (University of Notre Dame)
“Pritchard, Safety, Value”
Commentator: Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill University)

Thursday:

3E Invited Symposium: Statistics in Applied Epistemology
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Adam Morton (University of Alberta)
Speakers: Sherri Roush (University of California–Berkeley)
“Calibration, Credibility, and Equity”
Kent W. Staley (St. Louis University)
“Justification with Secure Evidence: Possibility Before Probability”
Joan Weiner (Indiana University–Bloomington)
“Might the Methodology of Biostatistics Be Telling Us Something Important About Semantics?”
Nancy Cartwright (London School of Economics and University of California–San Diego)
“Predicting What Will Happen When We Act: What Evidence Can Help”

3F Colloquium: Disagreement
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00
Chair: Mark Kaplan (Indiana University–Bloomington)
Speaker: Jonathan D. Matheson (University of North Florida)
“Equal Weight Views and the Evidential Impact of Peer Opinions”
Commentator: Anthony Brueckner (University of California–Santa Barbara)
10:00-11:00
Chair: Justin Dallmann (University of Southern California)
Speaker: S. Matthew Liao (New York University)
“Disagreeing with Peers: The Set Aside View”
Commentator: Michael Pace (Chapman University)
11:00-12:00
Chair: Helen Daly (University of Arizona)
Speaker: Tim Sundell (University of Kentucky)
“Objectivity Without Falsehood: Disagreement, Reference Magnetism, and the Possibility of Systematic Error”
Commentator: Alex Radulescu (University of California–Los Angeles)

4D Invited Symposium: Aristotle’s Epistemology
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Gareth Matthews (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Speakers: Robert Bolton (Rutgers University)
“Epistemology and Psychology in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II.19”
David Bronstein (Boston University)
“Episteme and Doxa in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I.33”
Commentators: Andrea Falcon (Concordia University)
Benjamin Morison (Princeton University)

4E Colloquium: Belief
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Nicoletta Orlandi (Rice University)
Speaker: Brett Sherman (University of Rochester)
“A Plea for Tracking”
Commentator: Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)
2:00-3:00
Chair: Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)
Speaker: Jane Friedman (Oxford University)
“Middling Credence and Suspended Judgment”
Commentator: Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (University of California–Los Angeles)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Abrol Fairweather (University of San Francisco)
Speaker: Mark E. Wunderlich (Union College)
“In Defense of Consistency Checks”
Commentator: Ryan Hebert (Washington State University)

5C Invited Paper: Easy Knowledge and Reliabilism
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Avram Hiller (Portland State University)
Speaker: Ram Neta (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“Easy Knowledge, Reliabilism, and the Transparency of Justification”
Commentators: Stewart Cohen (University of Arizona)
Anna-Sara Malmgren (University of Texas–Austin)

5F Colloquium: Epistemology
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00
Chair: Ethan Nowack (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Ian Schnee (University of Puget Sound)
“Duplicate Reasons”
Commentator: Edward Cushman (Lewis & Clark College)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Cory Wright (California State University–Long Beach)
Speaker: Michael R. Hicks (Brooklyn College)
“Know-Who and Testimony Mediated Acquaintance”
Commentator: Michael J. Raven (University of Victoria)

5I Colloquium: Thought Experiments
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00
Chair: Mitchell Herschbach (University of California–San Diego)
Speaker: Brian T. Talbot (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“An Argument for Old-Fashioned Intuition Pumping”
Commentator: Justin Sytsma (East Tennessee State University)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley (California State University–Bakersfield)
Speaker: Charles Repp (University of Toronto)
“Acquiring Justification from Fictional Narratives: What’s Wrong with the Thought Experiment Analogy”
Commentator: Margaret Moore (University of Leeds)

5L Symposium: The Value of True Belief
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: David Boersema (Pacific University)
Speaker: Chase B. Wrenn (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)
“Truth: The Worst of All Goods”
Commentators: Maria Baghramian (University College, Dublin)
Lindsay Craig (University of Oklahoma)

Friday:

6F Colloquium: Justification
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00
Chair: Bruce Hunter (University of Alberta)
Speaker: Ryan Byerly (Baylor University)
“Evidentialism and the Principle of Inferential Justification”
Commentator: Earl Conee (University of Rochester)
10:00-11:00
Chair: Sara Qualin (University of Wyoming)
Speaker: Kraig Martin (Baylor University)
“Can Epistemic Obligation Be Reduced to Synchronic Evidential Justification?”
Commentator: Jacob Caton (University of Arizona)
11:00-12:00
Chair: Steven Luper (Trinity University)
Speakers: Peter Kung (Pomona College)
Masahiro Yamada (Claremont Graduate University)
“There Is No Easy Bootstrapping Problem”
Commentator: Michael Titelbaum (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

8C Invited Paper: Practical Reasoning and Inference
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (Stanford University)
Speaker: Jonathan Dancy (University of Texas–Austin and University of Reading)
“From Thought to Action”
Commentators: Jason M. Bridges (University of Chicago)
Timothy Schroeder (Ohio State University)

Saturday:

9G Invited Symposium: Social Epistemology
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Matthew J. Brown (University of Texas–Dallas)
Speakers: Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut)
“Democracy and Epistemic Incommensurability”
Guy Axtell (Radford University)
“Individual, Social, and Institutional Virtue”
Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)
“Knowledge for Whom? The Question of ‘Significance’ in Feminist Epistemology”
Commentator: Nancy Daukas (Guilford College)

9I Colloquium: Perception
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00
Chair: Bernard W. Kobes (Arizona State University)
Speaker: Adrienne Prettyman (University of Toronto)
“Shifts of Attention and the Content of Perception”
Commentator: Bill Fish (Massey University)
10:00-11:00
Chair: Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
Speaker: John Spackman (Middlebury College)
“Conceptualism and the Richness of Perceptual Content”
Commentator: Brit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
11:00-12:00
Chair: Dorit Bar-On (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Speaker: Derek Brown (Brandon University)
“Losing Grip on the World: From Illusion to Sense-Data”
Commentator: Maja Spener (Oxford University)

10A Author-Meets-Critics: Tyler Burge, Origins of Objectivity
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Michael A. Rescorla (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Critic: Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University)
Author: Tyler Burge (University of California–Los Angeles)

10D Invited Symposium: Sensory Substitution and Sensory Augmentation
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Brian L. Keeley (Pitzer College)
Speakers: J. Kevin O’Regan (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique)
“Sensory Substitution and the Sensorimotor Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness”
Malika Auvray (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique)
“Perceiving with Compensatory Devices: Quasi-Vision or New Sensory Modality?”
Jon Bird (Open University)
“Transparency in Sensory Substitution and Sensory Augmentation”

11A Invited Paper: The Nature of Reasoning
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Aaron Zimmerman (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Speaker: Paul Boghossian (New York University)
“Reasons and Reasoning”
Commentators: John Broome (Oxford University)
Crispin Wright (New York University and University of Aberdeen)

11H Colloquium: The Synthetic A Priori
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00
Chair: Kenneth Lucey (University of Nevada–Reno)
Speaker: Glen Hoffmann (Ryerson University)
“Synthetic A Priori Infallibility”
Commentator: W. Russ Payne (Bellevue College)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Kaija Mortensen (University of California–Santa Cruz)
Speaker: Tyler Hildebrand (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Genuine Empirical Metaphysics”
Commentator: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)

11J Symposium: Formal Epistemology
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Valia Allori (Northern Illinois University)
Speakers: Richard Scheines (Carnegie Mellon University)
Gregory Wheeler (New University of Lisbon)
“Causation, Association, and Confirmation”
Commentators: Kenneth Easwaran (University of Southern California)
Christopher Hitchcock (California Institute of Technology)


Comments

Epistemology at the Pacific Division Meeting — 2 Comments

  1. Clayton,

    The paper is centrally concerned with the question in the title, but I don’t answer it. (Primarily because I don’t know the answer!) I take a look at DeRose’s request that the evidentialist explain why certain senses of ought that seem epistemic nonetheless aren’t. [For example, in one case DeRose tells us of a character named Henry who believe p, has evidence that supports p, and believes p based on his evidence, but, if he had inquired responsibly he would have had different evidence, evidence that supports not-p. There is a sense in which Henry ought to believe p and a sense in which he ought not. Why is only the former deserving of the title epistemic?]

    I offer some suggestions as to how one might answer his question, and argue that they don’t do the trick. I do not argue that the evidentialist has no good answer.

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