Some of the recent discussion of the Gettier problem has suggested that we simply abandon the intuitions that Gettier cases are not cases of knowledge. The plausibility of doing so depends on how obvious it is, regarding a particular case, that it is a case of knowledge. On this score, some of the examples in the literature are less plausible than others, and it might be interesting to find out what epistemologists think are the least compelling.
Among the least compelling, as I see it, are some of the social cases, such as Harman’s Jill/assassination case. Harman questions how Jill could know since she lacks some evidence that all those around her have. Maybe that’s right, but it must also be noticed that the evidence all those around her have is concocted and misleading evidence. I don’t find this point compelling against the case, but it makes me suspicious of it.
Lycan has an explanation in Judgement and Justification for why he is suspicious of both this case and the fake barn case, but I don’t remember the explanation and don’t have the book here at home to include the explanation. But it’s worth noting that Bill views both of these cases as not compelling. Are there other cases that epistemologists view suspiciously?