I’ve just put a draft online of a paper of mine on Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat. It’s a follow-up to some of my earlier posts on the topic, and as always, comments welcome.
The central idea is that there is a frontdoor and backdoor approach to the concept of defeat. Where the house itself is the noetic system, the backdoor approach conceives of defeat in terms of putting something in the house and seeing what gets kicked out the back door. The front door approach characterizes defeat prior to entering the house, the primary example of which is a relationship between the propositional contents of possible beliefs. Pollock’s account of defeat is an example of the latter; Plantinga’s of the former. The argument is a further defense of the view that propositional justification is more basic than doxastic justification, since I argue that there are irremediable problems for a backdoor approach to defeat.