Here’s a rather lighter issue than the recent posts, suitable for (some of our) weekend activities, an interesting epistemic issue in ordinary life: cases in which one disagrees with sports officials. I’ll use a baseball example, one where the umpire calls a player out at home, and you’re livid since the guy was obviously safe.
Here’s the facts relevant to the epistemic assessment of your opinion. First, you’re not entitled to think that you’re in a better position to observe the play than the umpire–there’s a reason they put them on the field, close to the action. Second, you’re probably not entitled to think that your eyesight is better than theirs. There will be special cases where you are entitled to this opinion, but not in the most common case. Third, you’re clearly not entitled to the opinion that you are better trained to observe such situations accurately, since the officials have had years of training before being hired for their jobs. Last, you also know that umpires make mistakes, and you know that you make mistakes.
Now, suppose you know all of these things to be true. You still hold that the guy was obviously safe. And I suppose you think your belief is rational, too. How can that be?