Following Michael Bergmann, let’s say that S’s belief that X is a reliable source of true beliefs is epistemically circular if S used X in order to arrive at this belief. A person who used memory to form the belief that my memory is reliable would have an epistemically circular belief.
I’m trying to understand the state of the debate in the epistemic circularity literature. From what I can tell, Richard Fumerton (his 1995 book), Jonathan Vogel (2000, “Reliabilism Leveled”), and Michael Huemer (2011, his recent PPR paper on his metacoherence problem) all seem to think that justified, epistemically circular beliefs are impossible. On the other hand, James van Cleve, William Alston, Michael Bergmann, James Pryor, Peter Markie, Ernest Sosa, and many others all think that it is possible for there to be justified, epistemically circular beliefs.
1) Am I correct to say that there is a growing consensus among nonskeptical epistemologists that it is possible to have justified, epistemically circular beliefs?
2) Are there others that I failed to mention who think that it is impossible for there to be justified, epistemically circular beliefs?
3) Certainly there are a great many cases in which epistemically circular beliefs are not justified. For those who think it is possible to have justified, epistemically circular beliefs, who among them actually gives conditions for when they are justified and when they are not? I know Bergmann does in his (2006) book. I hear that van Cleve does in his 1984 induction paper and that Pryor does in his 2004 “What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?” paper. (I still have to read the latter two papers.) Anybody else?