A fairly standard approach to the preface paradox is basically Lockean. On the Lockean story, belief is degree of belief past a certain threshold. We then explain away the inconsistency involved in the paradox by an underlying probabilistic coherence. The preface claim exceeds the threshold of belief, is inconsistent with the beliefs about the contents of the book, but probabilistically coheres because it accurately measures the risk of error in the book (and since the book is large enough, the risk of error is high enough to exceed the threshold).
In other cases, though, we explain away an underlying probabilistic incoherence among degrees of belief by cogency at the coarse-grained level. Below the fold is a case of this sort.
You are an expert witness in a court case. You are required to provide a sworn affadavit regarding what you may be called on to testify about in court. The matter is fairly complex, etc., so your sworn testimony is quite extensive. But you are an expert on the subject, so you prepare the content. You then must swear in writing that what you have told is the truth, which you correctly interpret to mean that you have left out no significant facts that pertain to the case and that nothing you have written is mistaken. You sign, and the document is notarized.
Note, though, that the legal document can precisely mirror a standard preface case, so if in the standard preface case, we can explain away inconsistency at the level of belief by probabilistic coherence at the level of credence, here we can explain away probabilistic incoherence at the level of credence by appeal to cogency at the level of belief. For, since the two cases mirror each other, if probabilistic coherence exists in the preface case because the book is large enough, probabilistic incoherence will exist when you are asked to swear veracity regarding the content of your written testimony.
What to learn from this isn’t completely clear, except for one point. I think the mere fact that one can find an underlying probabilistic coherence even though there is inconsistency at the level of coarse-grained belief, doesn’t by itself give us a solution to the paradox. For what to explain away and what to explain it away with isn’t uniform, as the above example shows.