Out with the old …

… skeptical arguments. A new paper of mine, “Skeptical Appeal: The Source-Content Bias” (forthcoming in Cognitive Science), uncovers a subtle mechanism that triggers knowledge-denial and contributes to the appeal of classic skeptical arguments. The mechanism is an interaction between two factors. … Continue reading

Wishful Thinking Problems for Reliabilism

Phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism get a bad rep for allowing some cases of wishful thinking to provide prima facie justification.  In this post, I argue that reliabilism has wishful thinking problems that are even worse. Contrast direct and indirect wishful … Continue reading

An Epistemological Argument for Disjunctivism

I’ve been thinking a bit about McDowell’s epistemological argument for the disjunctive conception of experience. One reaction I’ve come across in conversation is basically that McDowell derives an implausible claim about the nature of experience from implausible claims about perceptual … Continue reading

Hey Internalists, Which Experiences Justify and Why?

Here is my impression: it is very popular to allow certain kinds of experiences to provide (prima facie propositional) justification for certain propositions.  Which propositions might an experience justify?  The most straightforward thing to say is that certain experiences provide … Continue reading