A standard NEDP case will take a twin who is internally identical to me but whose beliefs are unreliably formed because of a demon. I share the intuition with internalists that this twin and I are justificationally identical. So, it … Continue reading
I admit it’s old news that JTB doesn’t intuitively equal K (50 years old this year in the Western tradition, about 1200 years old if you follow the Indo-Tibetan tradition), but if anyone still wants empirical confirmation, a little more … Continue reading
Synopsis: I wonder why, in light of some solid cases of lottery knowledge, people still doubt lottery knowledge. I also suggest an X-phi research project that thought would boom after 2004 but didn’t. General motivational prolegomena: So I made it … Continue reading
Following Michael Bergmann, let’s say that S’s belief that X is a reliable source of true beliefs is epistemically circular if S used X in order to arrive at this belief. A person who used memory to form the belief that … Continue reading
Creationism is more defensible The view that inference can create justification is more defensible than most people give it credit for. Who disagrees? [Ed. note: So the hypertext is supposed to pique interest, but judging from my inbox, it’s also … Continue reading
Phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism get a bad rep for allowing some cases of wishful thinking to provide prima facie justification. In this post, I argue that reliabilism has wishful thinking problems that are even worse. Contrast direct and indirect wishful … Continue reading
Can a subject’s beliefs, desires, fears, or goals causally influence the way things seem to her? Suppose that the answer is yes. That is, suppose that a subject’s mental states can penetrate the way things seem to her. What are … Continue reading
The question is meant this way: do your ontology and category theory, and then ask what true propositions are there that say that some such things are epistemically justified. Two answers have some plausibility: beliefs can be epistemically justified, and … Continue reading
F/M argue for the Equivalence Thesis, the claim that you are justified in believing something iff you have knowledge-level justification for it. I’ve argued against this thesis here, so I was especially interested in how they argue for it in … Continue reading
Another entry from my grad seminar’s close reading of this deep and important book, but fair warning to the reader: you need to be motivated by the intricacies of the argument here, since this is going to be a complicated … Continue reading