The Motivation for Classical Foundationalism

I’d be interested to hear people’s thoughts on the following question. Why does classical foundationalism claim that basic beliefs are epistemically privileged in the sense that they are indubitable, infallible, indefeasible, and so on? Roughly speaking, foundationalism is the view … Continue reading

New Page: Epistemology Course Slides

This past semester, I tried an experiment: I Beamer-ed up my entire epistemology course, so I thought I’d make the slides public. (For LaTeX-uninitiated, Beamer is a LaTeX class for creating slide presentations.) Some of the material on the slides … Continue reading

An Epistemological Argument for Disjunctivism

I’ve been thinking a bit about McDowell’s epistemological argument for the disjunctive conception of experience. One reaction I’ve come across in conversation is basically that McDowell derives an implausible claim about the nature of experience from implausible claims about perceptual … Continue reading

Hey Internalists, Which Experiences Justify and Why?

Here is my impression: it is very popular to allow certain kinds of experiences to provide (prima facie propositional) justification for certain propositions.  Which propositions might an experience justify?  The most straightforward thing to say is that certain experiences provide … Continue reading

It’s not the thought that counts

Let’s say that the mentalist about evidence believes the following supervenience thesis:

M: Necessarily, if A and B are in the same non-factive mental states from the cradle to the grave, A and B will share the same evidence from the cradle to the grave.

Here’s an argument against mentalism, so understood:

(1) We have non-inferential knowledge of the external world.
(2) If we know p non-inferentially, p is part of our evidence.
(3) If ~p, p is not part of our evidence.
(4) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and believe mistakenly that p.
(5) We know p non-inferentially.
(C) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and while p will not be part of their evidence, p will be part of ours.

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