I’d be interested to hear people’s thoughts on the following question. Why does classical foundationalism claim that basic beliefs are epistemically privileged in the sense that they are indubitable, infallible, indefeasible, and so on? Roughly speaking, foundationalism is the view … Continue reading
This past semester, I tried an experiment: I Beamer-ed up my entire epistemology course, so I thought I’d make the slides public. (For LaTeX-uninitiated, Beamer is a LaTeX class for creating slide presentations.) Some of the material on the slides … Continue reading
I’ve been thinking a bit about McDowell’s epistemological argument for the disjunctive conception of experience. One reaction I’ve come across in conversation is basically that McDowell derives an implausible claim about the nature of experience from implausible claims about perceptual … Continue reading
Here is my impression: it is very popular to allow certain kinds of experiences to provide (prima facie propositional) justification for certain propositions. Which propositions might an experience justify? The most straightforward thing to say is that certain experiences provide … Continue reading
Let’s say that the mentalist about evidence believes the following supervenience thesis:
M: Necessarily, if A and B are in the same non-factive mental states from the cradle to the grave, A and B will share the same evidence from the cradle to the grave.
Here’s an argument against mentalism, so understood:
(1) We have non-inferential knowledge of the external world.
(2) If we know p non-inferentially, p is part of our evidence.
(3) If ~p, p is not part of our evidence.
(4) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and believe mistakenly that p.
(5) We know p non-inferentially.
(C) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and while p will not be part of their evidence, p will be part of ours.
I couldn’t decide whether to post this here, at PEA Soup, or both. So, I posted it at PEA Soup and thought I’d post a link here instead of double posting. Some regular commentators comment both places, but many do … Continue reading
Green is in the good case so he knows all sorts of stuff about how things are and ought to be. Green knows that he ought to keep his promises when there’s no overriding reason not to, knows that he … Continue reading
Frege believed that the unrestricted comprehension axiom is true, and it is sad, since the axiom leads to paradox. If you are inclined toward coherentism, the rationality of Frege’s belief causes a problem, since it is logically inconsistent. I’ve been … Continue reading