The New Evil Demon and the Frankfurt-Style Counterfactual Intervener

When I consider the NEDP for reliabilism, the intuitions involved seem to support the view that external properties (e.g. reliable belief production) are not directly relevant to justification.  Furthermore, I take the motivating principle that is behind the intuition in … Continue reading

Fallibilism and Faculties: The Role of Evidential Probability

I am using Charity Anderson’s forthcoming Phil Studies paper on fallibilism and epistemic modality for my fallibilism seminar this semester and we discussing some of her work in progress in which she suggests that issues pertaining to the fallibility of … Continue reading

Wishful Thinking Problems for Reliabilism

Phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism get a bad rep for allowing some cases of wishful thinking to provide prima facie justification.  In this post, I argue that reliabilism has wishful thinking problems that are even worse. Contrast direct and indirect wishful … Continue reading