This has probably been discussed somewhere, but I haven’t seen it. 1. Here’s a pretty natural picture of learning from experience. A scientist S proposes some hypothesis H (which we will assume is true). She gathers evidence and it’s favorable … Continue reading

# Category Archives: confirmation theory

Or, more cautiously (sometimes I’m cautious), I find defeat talk misleading. And here’s why. Let q be the true proposition that S gives testimony with content p. This is a reason for me, at t1, the time of my hearing … Continue reading

I got back yesterday from the 7th annual Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW). [I presented my over-titled “Dealing with Disagreement from the First-person Perspective: A Probabilist(tm) Proposal” (draft) (slides).] It was held in Konstanz, Germany, just north of the Swiss border … Continue reading

I find the notion of outright belief pretty puzzling. I’m pretty inclined to take it to be a (probably context-sensitive or interest-relative) notion concerning degree of belief sufficiently close to certainty, or “practical certainty”. One reason to think there’s a … Continue reading

I got back yesterday from the conference on formal and traditional epistemology at Oklahoma organized by Jim Hawthorne and Wayne Riggs. It was utterly fabulous! Except that I was really sick when I talked, and had to leave early to … Continue reading

I got back yesterday from the conference on formal and traditional epistemology at Oklahoma organized by Jim Hawthorne and Wayne Riggs. It was utterly fabulous! Except that I was really sick when I talked, and had to leave early to … Continue reading

via Jon’s post below and Gillian Russell at TAR, Greg Restall summarizes and links to Branden Fitelson’s very interesting talk (pdf of Branden’s slides) at the Banff Mathematical Methods in Philosophy workshop. I’ve only seen the slides, but I have … Continue reading

John just sent me a really neat paper entitled “Probable Probabilities.” The abstract should entice reading the full manuscript: In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others … Continue reading

One of the lessons of Plantinga’s argument against evolutionary naturalism is that the mere fact that a claim is improbable on a certain piece of information doesn’t imply that the latter information is a defeater of any evidence in favor … Continue reading

David Lewis thought the following is true: The Principal Principle (PP): Ps(A|Po(A)=x)=x (where Ps is a rational subjective probability, and Po is some objective probability). Here’s a gloss of this claim, more or less accurate: if you know that the … Continue reading