Here’s a view that I think some people are attracted to, a tripartite view of how positive epistemic standing is attained: Tripartite View: For a belief to constitute knowledge, three elements have to be in place: (a) There’s the belief … Continue reading
If you’ll be in Boston for the Eastern, you’ll want to hear some of the epistemology talks. Here’s what I’ve found. (I’ve included entire sessions if it seems that there’s an epistemology talk in it.) I’m known to miss things, … Continue reading
I’ve been thinking a bit about McDowell’s epistemological argument for the disjunctive conception of experience. One reaction I’ve come across in conversation is basically that McDowell derives an implausible claim about the nature of experience from implausible claims about perceptual … Continue reading
I’ve tried to identify the epistemology talks that will be taking someplace in San Francisco at this year’s scattered APA meetings. Many of you have received letters urging you to stay out of the St. Francis, but at last check … Continue reading
Let’s say that the mentalist about evidence believes the following supervenience thesis:
M: Necessarily, if A and B are in the same non-factive mental states from the cradle to the grave, A and B will share the same evidence from the cradle to the grave.
Here’s an argument against mentalism, so understood:
(1) We have non-inferential knowledge of the external world.
(2) If we know p non-inferentially, p is part of our evidence.
(3) If ~p, p is not part of our evidence.
(4) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and believe mistakenly that p.
(5) We know p non-inferentially.
(C) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and while p will not be part of their evidence, p will be part of ours.
I’ve tried to identify the epistemology talks taking place at the Eastern division meetings this year. Missed some important sessions last year, so please mention talks in the comments that need to be added. Looking forward to seeing some of you there. I wouldn’t want to miss the battle royale involving some guy who thinks truth is necessary for warranted assertion and some other guy who thinks truth is required for warranted assertion.Continue reading
I couldn’t decide whether to post this here, at PEA Soup, or both. So, I posted it at PEA Soup and thought I’d post a link here instead of double posting. Some regular commentators comment both places, but many do … Continue reading
Green is in the good case so he knows all sorts of stuff about how things are and ought to be. Green knows that he ought to keep his promises when there’s no overriding reason not to, knows that he … Continue reading
It is officially Spring Break for us at SMU and while my students party on islands so exclusive their names are unknown to me, I’ll be heading to Oklahoma for the Epistemic Goodness Conference. I’m not jealous, by the way. … Continue reading
I suppose the upside of the financial meltdown and dismal job season is that loads of us will have plenty of time to kill at the Eastern so we can actually go to the talks and talk shop. Below the … Continue reading