An Epistemological Argument for Disjunctivism

I’ve been thinking a bit about McDowell’s epistemological argument for the disjunctive conception of experience. One reaction I’ve come across in conversation is basically that McDowell derives an implausible claim about the nature of experience from implausible claims about perceptual … Continue reading

It’s not the thought that counts

Let’s say that the mentalist about evidence believes the following supervenience thesis:

M: Necessarily, if A and B are in the same non-factive mental states from the cradle to the grave, A and B will share the same evidence from the cradle to the grave.

Here’s an argument against mentalism, so understood:

(1) We have non-inferential knowledge of the external world.
(2) If we know p non-inferentially, p is part of our evidence.
(3) If ~p, p is not part of our evidence.
(4) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and believe mistakenly that p.
(5) We know p non-inferentially.
(C) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental states as any one of us and while p will not be part of their evidence, p will be part of ours.

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Epistemology at the Eastern

I’ve tried to identify the epistemology talks taking place at the Eastern division meetings this year. Missed some important sessions last year, so please mention talks in the comments that need to be added. Looking forward to seeing some of you there. I wouldn’t want to miss the battle royale involving some guy who thinks truth is necessary for warranted assertion and some other guy who thinks truth is required for warranted assertion.

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