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Author Archives: Wesley Buckwalter

Telling, Showing and Knowing

Posted on October 9, 2013 by Wesley BuckwalterOctober 9, 2013
5

Pedagogy is a pillar of human culture and society. Our main vehicle for transmitting information is assertion. As we leave the forest, we tell our friend that there is a jaguar nearby. We also teach each other skills and crafts. We … Continue reading →

Posted in knowledge, testimony and social epistemology | 5 Replies

Belief through thick and thin

Posted on February 4, 2013 by Wesley BuckwalterFebruary 4, 2013
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Some readers may be interested in this new paper. In it, David Rose, John Turri, and I distinguish between two categories of belief — thin belief and thick belief — and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology, each … Continue reading →

Posted in knowledge | Leave a reply

Recent Posts

  • Young Epistemologist Prize 2019
  • A simple problem for (unrestricted) Conditionalization
  • Reminder: Young Epistemologist Prize 2019
  • Do We Know that We’re not Brains in Vats?: Follow-Up: Polls and Surveys
  • Call for Registration: 4th Foundations of Normativity Workshop, University of Edinburgh
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