The 2013 CSPA meeting, hosted by Oklahoma State University, will take place
October 4-5, 2013
Oklahoma State University, Tulsa Campus
Tulsa, OK 74106
Keynote Speaker: Professor Alison Jaggar (University of Colorado)
Colloquium papers in any area of philosophy are welcome. Submissions dealing with aspects of Profesor Jaggar’s work are encouraged. Papers are limited to 3,000 words. All submissions must be prepared for a blind review and include a word count fin addition to an abstract (not longer than 150 words). Submissions should be sent by e-mail, using the subject heading “CSPA submission,” to me at firstname.lastname@example.org. Responses to submissions will be sent by July 31, 2013.
The deadline for submissions is May 31, 2013.
Suggestions for commentators and session chairs (including self-nominations) are welcome.
Questions about local accommodations can be addressed to Professor Eric Reitan at [email@example.com].
Suggestions and questions regarding the program should be directed to me at firstname.lastname@example.org
Interview with Stephen available here: http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/understanding-understanding/, in connection with the Templeton grant on Understanding.
The fourth annual meeting of the Northwestern/Notre Dame (NU/ND) Graduate Epistemology conference is this Friday and Saturday, April 26-27, on the campus of Notre Dame (South Bend, Indiana). The keynote will be given by Professor Tom Kelly (Princeton). Details, including the program, can be found here. I hope to see some of you there.
Just saw this today: Logical Pluralism.
Why here? What does it have to do with epistemology? Well, I wonder how many think as I here. This is totally enigmatic, but I think of logic as a branch of epistemology, and the shining light of formal epistemology. The best available, at least until probability theory is formalized, and we get to Carnap and beyond.
Provocation invites retaliation, of course…
Finding Foundations for Bounded and Adaptive Rationality Minds and Machines Call for Extended Abstracts Deadline May 15, 2013 Minds and Machines is pleased to invite extended abstracts for “Finding Foundations for Bounded and Adaptive Rationality,” a special issue edited by Ralph Hertwig and Arthur Paul … Continue reading
Michael Hannon and I are organizing workshop entitled ‘The Roles of Knowledge’ in Cambridge, June 28th-29th. There will by talks by Jessica Brown, Mikkel Gerken, Michael Hannon, Clayton Littlejohn, Duncan Pritchard and Paulina Sliwa and comments by Natalie Ashton, Chris Cowie, Nick Hughes, Robin Mckenna, Emil Møller and Sebastian Nye.
It will be fun and you’re welcome to attend. If you plan to do so, please drop Michael (who is the organizer-in-chief) an email: email@example.com.
A website with further details is here: http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/news_events/roles_of_knowledge/roles_of_knowledge.html
It is a pleasure to announce a conference marking the 50th anniversary of the publication of Edmund Gettier’s famous article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” in 1963.
Thinking About Knowledge. Epistemology 50 Years after Gettier’s Paper
Fred Dretske Alvin Goldman John Greco
Saturday, April 13, 2013
Swarthmore College, Scheuer Room, Kohlberg Hall
10:00am-11:30am: Fred Dretske (Duke University): Golden Gettier: What We Should Have Learned
1:00pm-2:30pm: John Greco (Saint Louis University): Post-Gettier Epistemology
3:00pm-4:30pm: Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University) Gettier and the Epistemology of Philosophical Intuitions
This event is sponsored by the GPPC Board of Governors and the Mellon Foundation
The conference is free and open to the public
For further information contact Peter Baumann at 610-328-8433 or firstname.lastname@example.org
For directions to Swarthmore College see http://www.swarthmore.edu/visitordash/visitors_content_directions.php
For maps of Swarthmore College see http://www.swarthmore.edu/campusmap/
For more information see http://www.swarthmore.edu/visitordash/dash_visitors.php
Parking is available in the Dupont parking lot at the North Entrance on Whitter Drive, opposite Papazian Hall.
MEW 7 (2013) will be hosted by the University of Notre Dame Philosophy Department on November 7-9. The invited speakers are EJ Coffman, Jim Joyce, Jennifer Lackey, Kirk Ludwig, Jennifer Nagel, Tom Senor and Fritz Warfield. Alvin Goldman will give the keynote address. The local coordinators are Robert Audi and Mike DePaul. As further information becomes available, it will be posted on the MEW website.
MEW 9 (2015) will be hosted by the University of Missouri. Peter Markie and Matt McGrath are the local coordinators. Details are forthcoming.
We do not yet have a host institution for MEW 8 (2014) and would love to fill this gap. If you are a member of a philosophy department at a midwestern university and think your department might be interested in hosting MEW8, please contact either Sandy Goldberg or Al Casullo and we will be happy to provide the requisite information.
We are looking forward to seeing you at Notre Dame in November.
This is for an Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity, and is due to Daniel Star sometime in April, so I thought I’d link to the draft here, in case any want to help me by providing comments!
You can find a pdf of it here.
A standard NEDP case will take a twin who is internally identical to me but whose beliefs are unreliably formed because of a demon. I share the intuition with internalists that this twin and I are justificationally identical. So, it seems that reliable belief formation is not directly relevant to justification. We can make variants of this case by picking any external property (e.g. sensitivity, safety) and imagining that our internally identical twin lacks that property because of a demon. Intuitively, such believers will be justificationally identical.
I’ve argued recently (in Episteme, see here) that the new evil demon problem (NEDP) also applies to most internalist views, those which say that nonoccurrent (dispositional, background, unconscious) mental states are directly relevant to the justification of our beliefs. Here is the case I formulate: Continue reading