I got back yesterday from the conference on formal and traditional epistemology at Oklahoma organized by Jim Hawthorne and Wayne Riggs. It was utterly fabulous! Except that I was really sick when I talked, and had to leave early to … Continue reading
I got back yesterday from the conference on formal and traditional epistemology at Oklahoma organized by Jim Hawthorne and Wayne Riggs. It was utterly fabulous! Except that I was really sick when I talked, and had to leave early to … Continue reading
I’ve updated the LaTeX for Philosophers page to include a few concrete typesetting solutions, including how to typeset the non-monotonic squiggle (|~), and how to define new commands that take argument variables. There is also a proposal for rotating \vDash … Continue reading
Rather than use fresh parchment to transcribe the Archimedes Palimpsest prayer book, John Myronas, a 13th century scribe, reused pages from other books of that period. Apparently the scrubbed-off ink is readable with new imagining technology, and researchers are discovering … Continue reading
The first issue of The Reasoner, volume 1, no 1, is now online. Feature articles by Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno, Laurence Goldstein, Amit Pundik, and Gregory Wheeler. The deadline for vol. 1, no. 2 is May 15. … Continue reading
Sometimes we defer in opinion. When we should so defer is an interesting question, but here’s one possibility I haven’t seen discussed. Should we defer to ourselves? Consider the following deference principle: Self-Deference: C-me-now(p/C-me-now(p) = x) = x. This principle … Continue reading
In anticipation of the upcoming Rugers Epistemology Conference, I’ve put my (brief!) collection of non-factive uses of ‘knows’ online. I welcome suggestions for additions, especially anecdotes of spoken uses. … Continue reading
Back at Acme, our team of epistemologists are on the scene looking at Inspector 14′s record of length measurements for pole 453-01-120. Name this pole “p”. To simplify, suppose there are n physical measurements, the conditions for measurement were standardized, … Continue reading
Many philosophers argue that paradoxes like the so-called “preface paradox” show that it is not a requirement of rationality that the contents of one’s beliefs should all be consistent with each other. (For example, David Christensen argues for this in … Continue reading
An issue that comes up in discussions of the value of knowledge (and which will come up this week at our session at the Central meeting on the value turn in epistemology) is the special value knowledge is supposed to … Continue reading