A Healthy Respite
Posts by me will take on a more intermittent quality over the rest of the summer. I’ll be travelling some, but the main reasons are two. First, I’ve agreed to give some talks next year, and it’s always better to … Continue reading
Posts by me will take on a more intermittent quality over the rest of the summer. I’ll be travelling some, but the main reasons are two. First, I’ve agreed to give some talks next year, and it’s always better to … Continue reading
Suppose you wanted to teach epistemology using sources other than those by philosophers. You want to use literature, science, and other kinds of things when they provide a vehicle for discussing important epistemological issues. To get things started, here’s one … Continue reading
Foley says the following about irresponsible ignorance: If I do not have beliefs one way or the other about P, but it is epistemically rational for me to believe that I have not expended enough time and effort in arriving … Continue reading
At Erfurt, September 8-10, 2005. Conference announcement and program is here, and speakers include CD’s own Tim Williamson and Ernie Sosa. The most heartwarming title of a talk at the conference goes to Frank Jackson: “On Not Forgetting the Epistemology” … Continue reading
Uriah Kriegel defends the SOM Theory of consciousness, and I’m thinking about the application of the view to epistemological theories. To get to the application stage, we need to assume the following: 1. Conscious states have content, since they are … Continue reading
Williamson and Hawthorne, among others, endorse a closure principle about knowledge that employs the concept of a competent deduction. The straightforward version is that if you know p and competently deduce q from p, then you know q. As most … Continue reading
One of my concerns about the Academy is the state of its administration. I’ve got no hard data on this score, but there don’t seem to be that many Foleys around (some though: Holly Smith, Myles Brand, and Marshall Swain … Continue reading
Williamson and Hawthorne, among others, endorse a closure principle about knowledge that employs the concept of a competent deduction. The straightforward version is that if you know p and competently deduce q from p, then you know q. As most … Continue reading
My internet connection supplier had a problem last night that shut down my access. I don’t know if it will be back up today, but if you comment and it doesn’t show up for quite a while, it’s because I … Continue reading
Over coffee yesterday, Peter told me of the following Dretske view (it’s in one of the recent Blackwell volumes edited by Steup, I think, but I don’t recall which one Peter said). To be appeared to banana-ly, one must be … Continue reading