to CD’s own Matt Weiner, whose paper, “Must We Know What We Say?” (draft, in pdf format, available here), has been accepted by my favorite journal, The Philosophical Review. This is almost month-old news, but I just recently heard. So … Continue reading
The Philosophical Quarterly has a special issue (April 2005) on Contextualism that has just hit the shelves (at least here at the Yale library). Contents: -Michael Brady & Duncan Pritchard: “Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects,” pp. 161-171 -Keith DeRose: “The … Continue reading
There’s a way of understanding the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge that makes infallibilism its ancestor. To get this result, play the “all-or-nothing” game with the skeptic so that the skeptic gets everything s/he wants if (and only if) s/he … Continue reading
A note from Bryan Frances that might interest some here: Specialist in Mind-Epistemology-Language wanted at Leeds; contact Bryan Frances at b.frances@leeds.ac.uk. Bryan assures me that even though the ad specifies philosophy of mind, that’s a bit misleading. He says, “Although … Continue reading
A question about the literature on closure principles, either for knowledge or justification. The usual story seems to be that denials of closure are first found in Dretske’s “Epistemic Operators” from 1970. Anyone know of earlier denials?
A triumph of AI has just made CS research papers a snap to write and a pleasure to read. Wow your friends! Impress your Dean! Become a Scientist, Today! … Continue reading
Linked to in the sidebar under Work in Progress is Ram’s new paper Undermining the Case for Contrastivism. Check it out! … Continue reading
One characterization of what happens with specialization in philosophy is that the strategy becomes that of collecting patches for an idea, and that certainly characterizes Plantinga’s theory of warrant. In my view, the sequence of patches reveals something important (i.e., … Continue reading
Matt W. notes the perplexity over at TAR caused by the following remark of Williamson’s: Knowledge is the norm of belief: a flat-out belief is fully justified if and only if it constitutes knowledge. The perplexity is caused by reading … Continue reading
Brian Weatherson had a couple of posts critical of Williamson last week at his blog. While I’m sympathetic to what I think Brian’s general point is, I’m not sure I agree with the claims in this post. The dispute is … Continue reading