## CMSRA-IV Second Call

Second call for The Fourth International Workshop on Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications CMSRA-IV, to be held September 21-23, 2005 in Lisbon, Portugal. Invited Speakers: Teddy Seidenfeld, H. A. Simon Professor of Statistics and Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon Wiebe … Continue reading

## In search of the Holy Grail: Probability and Inductive Logic Texts

It’s that time of year again. The forms for fall 2005 textbooks are sitting in my mailbox. And I am genuinely stuck. I’m slated to teach a graduate course in the Philosophical Uses of Probability. I can expect the students … Continue reading

## CMSRA-IV Final Call

This is the final call for papers for the Fourth International Workshop on Scientific Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications, CMSRA-IV Lisbon, to be held in Lisbon, Portugal, September 21-23, 2005. Note the extended deadlines: submission of abstracts are now … Continue reading

## What Defeats Testimony?

In the previous post Jon writes: I’m thinking of the following kinds of cases: empirical disputes, political disputes, moral disputes, etc. There are two, er, bizarre views here: the first is that unanimity of testimony is required for rational acceptance … Continue reading

## Arguments from Experience

Over at Prosblogion, they are having a discussion of the argument from religious experience. One of the comments says the following: I’ve always thought that the argument from religious experience had a certain strength to it. In order for it … Continue reading

## Disjunctivism Conference

From Adrian Haddock, an announcement of a conference this June: Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience University of Glasgow Saturday 4th & Sunday 5th June, 2005 Overview Disjunctivism became well-known with work in the philosophy … Continue reading

## Rational Acceptance and Conjunctive/Disjunctive Absorption

Two distinct features of the Keynes-Kyburg conception of probability are: (i) probability represents a logical relation that is objective, and (ii) not all probabilities are comparable. The non-comparability of probability is the starting point for this work in progress, which … Continue reading

## Epistemology at the Pacific

Should have posted earlier, but there’s some epistemology going on at the Pacific as well. CD-er’s in bold again and I’ll put the info below the fold.

## Central Division Epistemology

I goofed and deleted the last entry on epistemology at the Central Division. So here it is again, below the fold. CD’er’s are in bold, and if I leave something out, add it to the comments.

## Two new SEP entries on perception

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has two new entries on perception. Tim Crane’s The Problem of Perception is up, and so is Susanna Siegel’s The Contents of Perception. Together with Larry BonJour’s Epistemological Problems of Perception, there’s as good an … Continue reading