We’re having a workshop in the fall of 2006 here at Missouri. The dates are September 28-30, and the particular topic concerns the overlap between ethics and epistemology (touching on some of the same issues that have been posted and … Continue reading
It is obvious and well-known that it is one thing for it to appear to you that p is false, and another thing for it not to appear to you that p is true. The former prima facie justifies you … Continue reading
Following up on the last post about the epistemological status of belief in free will, I suspect that the argument against free-willers (that they are hard-hearted) depends implicitly on the fact that it is a decidedly minority view, and if … Continue reading
Over at the Garden of Forking Paths, they are having a discussion about the evidence for libertarianism regarding free will. Glossing details, the concern is that without strong reason to believe in free will, our punishment practices are not warranted. … Continue reading
Consider the following sincere assertion in English: “I don’t know whether Bush is the worst President of the last hundred years, but the evidence shows that he is.” I’m trying to avoid using the language of epistemic justification here for … Continue reading
Over at Pea Soup, Jason Kawall considers Russ Shaffer-Landau’s argument tying realism in morality with what Russ takes to be an appropriate view in epistemology: I think that intrinsic normativity is ineliminable. To see this, consider the parallels between conditions … Continue reading
If you’re attracted at all to relevant alternatives theories in epistemology, you’ll find some attraction in the contrastivist suggestion that some epistemic predicates are 3-place predicates. For example, you might be attracted to the idea that knowledge is best represented … Continue reading
As a follow-up to the discussion he began here on epistemic possibility, Michael now has a draft of his paper on epistemic possibility at: http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/epistemic.pdf. Check it out! … Continue reading
Dale Matthew, a grad student at York, sent me a case that raises an interesting issue for evidentialists. Here’s the case: It is the consensus of a scientific community that P. In coming to accept P they used all the … Continue reading
Sandy was here last weekend, and one of the issues that came up in discussion had to do with the internalism/externalism controversy and its connection with the Gettier problem. Sandy conjectured that externalists take, or are entitled to take, their … Continue reading