Suppose one adopts a closure principle for justification of the following sort: CLOSURE: If S justifiably believes p and justifiably believes that p implies q, then S is justified in believing q. Justifiably believing implies believing, in this formulation, but … Continue reading
Consider the following principle, one lifted from the same Feldman piece that prompted the last post: Evidence that there is evidence for P is evidence for P. I’ll call this principle the “metaevidence” principle. According to this principle, no matter … Continue reading
Rich Feldman is one of my very favorite epistemologists. Some of my respect is self-interested: I agree with a vast majority of his expressed epistemological views. But there’s more to it than just self-congratulation involved when I read his stuff. … Continue reading
The comments on my first post about openmindedness make me think that we might need a two dimensional framework for belief. One dimension is that standard Bayesian one of degree of belief. The other, central to the concept of openmindedness, … Continue reading
Wayne Riggs has a new paper up on his website that has me thinking about openmindedness again (by the way, Wayne, I think Greg Pappas had a piece on this topic once in the Peirce Transactions). Two questions are central … Continue reading
Fake Barn Country is having a lively discussion on Foley’s work, gypsy lawyer counterexamples as well as other topics in epistemology. Some of the discussion I’ve been part of as the lone defender of my illustrious mentor’s views, and I … Continue reading
I just received in the mail from Blackwell my copy of the new book, Sosa and His Critics, featuring, of course, essays about CD’s own Ernest Sosa, many of them by CD-ers, the majority of them on Sosa’s epistemology, together … Continue reading
The first Philosopher’s Carnival, a collection of some items that have appeared on philosophy weblogs, is here. The plan, I believe, is to put up items every week or so at this site. … Continue reading
Clayton Littlejohn sent me an interesting email about justification, and with his permission I’m quoting it here so that our discussion can be available to others as well. Clayton’s questions are about the relationship between personal and doxastic justification, as … Continue reading
Think about traditional theories of perception, such as the theory of appearing, sense-data theories, or adverbial theories. Each of these theories is aimed at a metaphysical question, the issue of what the immediate object of perception is, if any (so … Continue reading