The 2005 edition of REC is scheduled for May 6-7. Our contributors are well-represented at this conference as well: speakers include Keith DeRose and Richard Fumerton; round table panelists include Jennifer Lackey; and discussants-at-large include Juan Comesana, Michael Huemer, and … Continue reading
Upcoming, 8/20 to 8/22. Our contributors participating in the conference include paper-presenters Jim Pryor and Ernie Sosa, commentators Earl Conee and Al Casullo, and participants Juan Comesana, Rich Feldman, and Jennifer Lackey. For more information, click here. … Continue reading
My earlier post on the relationship between ethical internalism and the analogue in epistemology was intended partially to raise the issue of noncognitivism in epistemology. It is a bit surprising to find that view so popular in ethics, but quite … Continue reading
There’s a certain understanding as to what contextualists think or say about disputes between skeptics and their opponents that seems to be very widely assumed. And here it pops up again, in Mark Richard’s (very well worth reading) recent article, … Continue reading
The success of our blog raises a question. Most of our entries are getting extended discussion, leading me to wonder whether there is a point at which the discussions could be returned to the main page as main entries. The … Continue reading
One of the primary influences that can be seen in contrastivism is the pragmatic tradition stemming from Pierce and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Dewey. One way to develop this approach is to adopt a particular account of knowledge and … Continue reading
The Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference looks fantastic, and the schedule includes papers by some of the contributors to this site: Stewart Cohen, “Knowledge, Speaker, and Subject” Juan Comesana, “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem” and Matthew McGrath, “No Objects, … Continue reading
I’ve just put a draft online of a paper of mine on Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat. It’s a follow-up to some of my earlier posts on the topic, and as always, comments welcome. The central idea is that there … Continue reading
Contrastivism holds that the truth makers for knowledge attributions always involve a contrast, and Hawthorne thinks that if you know something, you are entitled to use it in practical reasoning. So one way to test what it is known is … Continue reading
Think of ethical internalism as a view that insists that moral beliefs and attitudes are intrinsically motivating. This kind of internalism/externalism issue has had little play in epistemology, and its absence is puzzling. So suppose we distinguish epistemic principles from … Continue reading