This is for an Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity, and is due to Daniel Star sometime in April, so I thought I’d link to the draft here, in case any want to help me by providing comments! You can … Continue reading
A standard NEDP case will take a twin who is internally identical to me but whose beliefs are unreliably formed because of a demon. I share the intuition with internalists that this twin and I are justificationally identical. So, it … Continue reading
I am using Charity Anderson’s forthcoming Phil Studies paper on fallibilism and epistemic modality for my fallibilism seminar this semester and we discussing some of her work in progress in which she suggests that issues pertaining to the fallibility of … Continue reading
If that title buys me a few seconds of your attention, let me unpack those two questions just enough to show you exactly what I mean to ask here. What I mean to ask is: Is it universally understood that … Continue reading
Phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism get a bad rep for allowing some cases of wishful thinking to provide prima facie justification. In this post, I argue that reliabilism has wishful thinking problems that are even worse. Contrast direct and indirect wishful … Continue reading
Can a subject’s beliefs, desires, fears, or goals causally influence the way things seem to her? Suppose that the answer is yes. That is, suppose that a subject’s mental states can penetrate the way things seem to her. What are … Continue reading
I’d be interested to hear people’s thoughts on the following question. Why does classical foundationalism claim that basic beliefs are epistemically privileged in the sense that they are indubitable, infallible, indefeasible, and so on? Roughly speaking, foundationalism is the view … Continue reading
This past semester, I tried an experiment: I Beamer-ed up my entire epistemology course, so I thought I’d make the slides public. (For LaTeX-uninitiated, Beamer is a LaTeX class for creating slide presentations.) Some of the material on the slides … Continue reading
I’ve been thinking a bit about McDowell’s epistemological argument for the disjunctive conception of experience. One reaction I’ve come across in conversation is basically that McDowell derives an implausible claim about the nature of experience from implausible claims about perceptual … Continue reading
Here is my impression: it is very popular to allow certain kinds of experiences to provide (prima facie propositional) justification for certain propositions. Which propositions might an experience justify? The most straightforward thing to say is that certain experiences provide … Continue reading